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Abstract: With the adoption of the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), the Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) and 
the Gender Directive on goods and services (2004/113/EC) and their subsequent interpretation by the Court of Justice, 
the landscape of EU non-discrimination law changed dramatically. Beyond this legal evolution, an important discursive 
shift contemporaneously reframed equality as a genuine fundamental right, in opposition to its historical function as a 
catalyst for market integration. The aim of this article is to critically interrogate what has been presented as the normative 
transformation of EU equality law in the aftermath of the 2000s. The present article deconstructs this disruptive narrative 
and contests the conventionally assumed radical dichotomy between market integration and human rights as overarching 
rationales for the Union’s commitment to equality. It explores the tension between an ambitious fundamental rights 
rhetoric and the pragmatic fluctuations of the substance of the principle of equality in EU law. It argues that the ‘new’ 
post-Amsterdam language of rights, under the guise of ‘progress’, covers an actual continuity in the normative grammar 
of EU non-discrimination law. Arguably, the very normative indeterminacy of equality facilitated its exploitation by 
different EU actors to advance their own strategic aims. This resulted in a form of hybridity of the principle of non-
discrimination, with important consequences in terms of enforceable equality rights and their hierarchy. The 
demonstration offered here operates at three different levels: the analysis successively focuses on the material and 
discursive substance of equality, its normative foundations and its operationalization in order to explore the question of 
the transformation of EU equality law beyond disruptive narratives and false dichotomies.  
 
I. Introduction 
Almost two decades ago, pivotal reforms attracted much attention and brought about important 
advancements to the field of equality law in the European Union (EU).1 Beyond their obvious legal 
contribution, these reforms also entailed important discursive changes. They decisively reframed 
what had originally been conceived as an instrument to advance market integration, the principle of 
non-discrimination, through a relatively new rhetoric of equality as a human right. Thereby, the 
declared ambition was to reshape the normative underpinnings of EU non-discrimination law. 
This evolution in the legal rhetoric matched a blossoming political discourse on the 
Union’s role as a guardian of fundamental and human rights which is still topical today. In his 2017 
State of the Union speech, Jean-Claude Juncker emphasized the centrality of the principle of equality 
for Union law2: 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22; Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] 
OJ L303/16; Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37.  
 See also Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23 and Directive 2010/41/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 
86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L180/1. 
2 Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the EU Commission, State of the Union 2017 (Brussels, 13 September 
2017). 
 
Europe must be a Union of equality. 
In a Union of equals, there can be no second-class citizens. 
In a Union of equals, there can be no second-class workers. 
In a Union of equals, there can be no second-class consumers. 
With the reforms of the 2000s, the principle of non-discrimination in fact imposed itself on new sets 
of social interactions as its scope of protection enlarged. Some authors have concluded to the 
acquisition by the principle of equality of a new ‘transformative’ function.3 
Despite what can be called a revolution, today the European corpus of non-
discrimination norms remains both fragmented and contested. On the one hand, the comprehensive 
reform expected to harmonize the scope of the principle of non-discrimination for all Europeans has 
been under discussion at the Council for the last ten years.4 This legislative stagnation perpetuates 
the fragmentation of the body of rules prohibiting discrimination. On the other hand, decisive 
breakthroughs in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter 
‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’) sparked strong criticism and resistance, casting doubts on the status of 
equality as a fundamental value of EU law. Hence, equality as a core structuring principle of society 
so far remains a piecemeal. 
The aim of this article is therefore to critically interrogate the normative 
transformation of the principle of equality in EU law since the 2000s. It explores the tension between 
an ambitious fundamental rights rhetoric and the pragmatic fluctuations of the substance of the 
principle of equality in EU law. To this end, the paper deconstructs the disruptive narrative of a 
metamorphosis of equality from an instrumental catalyst for market integration into a genuine human 
right. It contests the conventionally assumed radical dichotomy between market integration and 
human rights as overarching rationales for the Union’s commitment to equality.5 Instead, the 
argument is that the ‘new’ post-Amsterdam language of rights, under the guise of ‘progress’, covers 
an actual continuity in the normative grammar of EU non-discrimination law. Arguably, the very 
normative indeterminacy of equality facilitated its exploitation by different actors of the EU to 
advance their own strategic aims.6 This resulted in a form of hybridity of the principle of equality.  
The demonstration operates at three different levels and successively focuses on the 
material and discursive substance of equality, its normative foundations and its operationalization. 
First, the article explores the substantive and discursive construction of the post-2000s EU equality 
regime. It reviews the efforts of the European legislator and the CJEU to advance equality as a 
socially structuring principle. It shows how EU institutions, the Court, and the civil society have 
been juggling with the normative foundations of the principle of non-discrimination in order to 
pragmatically advance its status and function in EU law (Section II). The following section examines 
the normative underpinnings of the principle of equality. It explores the discrepancy between the 
                                                 
3  See Elise Muir, ‘The Transformative Function of EU Equality Law’ (2013) 5 European Review of Private 
Law. 
 
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2008/0426 final on a Proposal for a Council 
Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation SEC(2008) 2172 [2008] OJ C303/21 (hereinafter the ‘Horizontal 
Proposal’ or the ‘Proposal’). 
5 See Mark Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
1–3 and 6–31. 
6 See Peter Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 3. 
 
 
grand narrative of a transformation of equality as a fundamental human right and the pragmatism 
displayed by EU institutions (Section III). It takes a closer look at the cognitive dissonance created 
by the coexistence of apparently diverging normative frames, as well as their accommodation in 
what has become a deeply hybrid principle. The final section scrutinizes the consequences for the 
practical operation of equality. It investigates how the very hybridity of the non-discrimination 
principle led to a double hierarchy of equality protection, which limits the transformative reach of 
equality as a socially structuring principle in the EU (Section IV). 
II. The incomplete mutation of non-discrimination into a 
transformative general principle 
Since the comprehensive reforms of the 2000s, the landscape of EU non-discrimination law has 
changed completely. This section examines how the terms of the equality debate in EU law have 
been reset. Ambitioning to shape non-discrimination into a fundamental right which could constitute 
at the same time a structuring principle of the community, the EU legislator (sub-section A), together 
with EU civil society, and the CJEU (sub-section B) stretched the scope and application of equality. 
A. A triple motion towards a right to equality ‘in all areas of life’? 
Re-tracing the evolution of the principle of equality in EU law reveals a triple motion which changed 
the scope of the principle (i), its language (ii) and its effect (iii).  
(i) Towards an extensive principle: broadening and deepening equality 
The history of the transformation of the non-discrimination principle started with the battle for equal 
pay in the middle of the 1970s.7 The CJEU’s activism at the time of Defrenne II triggered a long 
transformation process. The reformative movement amplified and later found expression in the 
important legislative changes of the 2000s.8 These reforms codified the CJEU’s case law, opened 
new pathways, and modernized the field of EU equality law.9 EU non-discrimination law became 
subjected to a triple motion: one of broadening with the expansion of the equality protection to new 
grounds beyond sex and nationality; one of deepening by expanding the scope of the principle itself; 
but also one of anchoring equality within the language of rights. The purpose was to give equality the 
general traits of a human right.  
To briefly retrace the expansion of EU anti-discrimination law, two major pieces of 
legislation were passed in 2000: the Race Equality Directive and the Framework Equality 
Directive.10 The main actors behind this change were of two kinds. On the one hand, strongly 
mobilized civil society organizations pushed for encompassing reforms of the Treaty and 
                                                 
7 C-43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (no. 2) 
EU:C:1976:56, [1976] ECR 455. Defrenne II is the landmark case that has established the horizontal direct 
effect of the principle of gender equality contained in Article 157 TFEU (ex-Art. 141 TEC). 
8 See n 1. 
9 See n 1 and Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP, and ETUC and repealing 
Directive 96/34/EC [2010] OJ L 68/13. 
10 See n 1. 
 
legislation.11 On the other, EU policy makers, notably the Commission, were amenable to a 
strengthening of the equality principle. As a result, the Race Equality Directive extended the 
principle of equal treatment to race and ethnic origin in the fields of employment and vocational 
training, membership of a professional organization, social protection, including social security and 
health care, social advantages, education, and the access to and supply of goods and services 
including housing.12 The scope of the directive is wide, affording the broadest protection against 
discrimination in the EU so far, to many essential fields of everyday life in both the private and the 
public sectors. In parallel, the Framework Equality Directive extended the principle of equal 
treatment to the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation, but in the field 
of employment and vocational training only. Hence, from 2000 onwards the number of grounds 
protected evolved from two to seven, and the areas regulated extended beyond employment, thus 
broadening and deepening equality protection.13 
The scope of protection against sex discrimination expanded too. In the aftermath of 
the two 2000 directives, the debate on gender equality was revived and legislative amendments 
subsequently codified the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Directive 2002/73/EC amended the previous 
Directive 76/207/EEC promoting equal treatment for men and women in the field of employment, 
notably by including definitions of direct and indirect discrimination, thus enhancing the 
protection.14 Most importantly, Directive 2004/113 EC deepened the scope of the principle of gender 
equality by applying the protection to the access to, and supply of, goods and services.15 In 2006, 
Directive 2006/54/EC16 modernized and simplified the application of the principle of equal treatment 
on the basis of sex. Directive 2010/41/EC17 followed, with the same purpose in the field of self-
employment. By deepening the scope of the existing protection, the EU sought to strengthen its 
corpus of equality norms and to harmonize the coverage across ‘historic’ and ‘new’ grounds. 
(ii) Changing the parameters of the non-discrimination debate: crafting a fundamental 
right 
Beyond the double motion of broadening and deepening non-discrimination law, a 
third movement consisted in anchoring non-discrimination law within the framework of fundamental 
rights. This change started after the Maastricht Treaty, with a preliminary liberation from market 
                                                 
11 Crucial transnational stakeholders were for instance the Starting Line Group for the Race Equality 
Directive. See I Chopin and J Niessen, Proposals for Legislative Measures to Combat Racism and Promote 
Equal Rights in the European Union (Brussels: Commission for Racial Equality and the Starting Line Group, 
1998). 
12 This could potentially include the media and advertising when understood as services, as they are not 
explicitly excluded from the directive, contrary to the Gender Goods and Services Directive 2004/113/EC. 
13 This includes nationality. 
14 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women 
as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [2002] OJ 
L269/15. 
15 Directive 2004/113/EC (n 1). 
16 Directive 2006/54/EC (n 1). 
17 Directive 2010/41/EU (n 1). 
 
logics through the creation of a European citizenship which extended the rights granted to workers to 
all citizens.18 Yet, the years 1999 and 2000 marked the real beginning of the fundamental rights era 
for the EU with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the adoption of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter the Charter). Articles 21 and 23 guaranteeing equality as 
a fundamental right beyond the limited scope of employment bear witness to this evolution. In its 
summary of legislation on fundamental rights and non-discrimination, the EU legislator in fact states 
that ‘[b]y bringing fundamental rights to the fore, those who drafted the Treaty of Amsterdam were 
endeavouring to give formal recognition to human rights’. The Amsterdam Treaty therefore 
corresponds to a shift towards the constitutionalization of human rights as fundamental norms.  
In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and confirmed the existence of a 
fundamental right to non-discrimination by granting constitutional status to the Charter, to the same 
extent as Treaty provisions prohibiting non-discrimination such as Articles 2 and 3 TEU, and 
Articles 8 and 19 TFEU. Consequently, the prohibition of discrimination contained in its Article 21 
and 23 became directly applicable within the scope of EU law.19  The following year the EU ratified 
the UN International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), an act which 
embodied the EU’s enterprise to align the principle of equality of the Union’s citizens with the 
international human rights regime. Moreover, promising discussions on the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR started at the same time, before reaching a stalemate in 2014 with Opinion 2/13.20 Despite 
the CJEU’s opinion against the EU’s accession to the ECHR, protection against discrimination in the 
EU has been gradually, if only partially, anchored into a European and international framework of 
fundamental and human rights. This is illustrated, inter alia, by the loose dialogue that the CJEU and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) still maintain with each other.21 Finally, the human 
                                                 
18 One example is the freedom of movement, from which citizens could also benefit in addition to workers. 
This rights-based EU citizenship was subsequently confirmed in Zambrano at [41] and Dereci at [62] in 2011. 
See C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) EU:C:2011:124, [2011] ECR I-
01177 and C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres EU:C:2011:734, [2011] ECR 
000. 
19 European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/3 Article 21 on non-
discrimination states: ‘1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of 
application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union, and 
without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited.’ and Article 23 on equality between men and women states: ‘Equality between men and 
women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not 
prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-
represented sex’. 
20 See Opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU [2014] EU:C:2014:2454 and Recommendation 
SEC(2010) 305 final for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession 
Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) [2010]. 
21 Judge Rosas has qualified this judicial dialogue as a ‘semi-vertical relation’, explaining that ‘[i]n actual 
practice, the Luxembourg judges follow very closely the case-law of the Strasbourg Court’. This is notably 
true in the field of fundamental rights, where ‘[s]ince the mid-1990s, the E.C.J. cite[s] the E.C.H.R. on a 
regular basis in their judgments’ and ‘the E.C.H.R., too, from time to time cites the case-law of the 
Luxembourg courts’. See A Rosas ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial 
Dialogue’ (2008) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 2, 126–8 and in particular at 127. See also D 
Spielmann, ‘The Judicial Dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights Or how to remain good neighbours after the Opinion 2/13’ (2017) FRAME <http://www.fp7-
frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ECHRCJUEdialog.BRUSSELS.final_.pdf> (accessed 16 August 
 
rights discourse promoted in the field of non-discrimination law is visible in the language chosen to 
justify the EU politics of equality today. To name just one example, the 2008 Proposal for a 
Horizontal Directive presents fundamental rights as one of the bigger aims of EU anti-discrimination 
law and policy.22  
This linguistic dimension is not benign because, as Somek puts it, ‘Member States 
find themselves forced to re-describe and to restructure their social world along the lines of the 
imagery of meaning generated in Commission and Council documents’.23 The ‘rights’ discourse 
therefore proposes and diffuses a new cognitive scheme and conceptual categories though which to 
perceive non-discrimination law. It contributes to reshaping representations, norms and knowledge 
and, as the next sections show, has affected the way actors think, make, enforce and talk about non-
discrimination law. 
(iii) Enhancing the horizontal dimension of the principle of non-discrimination 
This three-pronged broadening, deepening and anchoring motion can be described, in the words of 
Muir, as ‘transformative’.24 The transformative nature of equality ensues from the efforts of the 
legislator to increase the hold of the principle of non-discrimination over interpersonal relationships 
in various domains of social life.25 From a vertical principle protecting citizens against arbitrariness 
emanating from public authorities, it became, over time, a horizontal norm increasingly regulating 
large subsets of private social interactions among EU citizens’.26  This change in fact translates into 
the reinforcement of the so-called privatization of the principle of equal treatment, which spreads 
horizontally into EU society.27 It has been argued that equality takes on a transformative function 
                                                 
2017), 18: after Opinion 2/13, ‘[b]oth courts follow closely each other’s case law and are willing more or less 
to make the necessary adjustments in order to avoid blatant discrepancies as regards the level and modalities 
of protection of fundamental rights’. For a concrete example, see also C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria 
AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [2015] EU:C:2015:480 [46], [73] and C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui 
and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole SA EU:C:2017:204 [28] and 
C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure 
Solutions NV EU:C:2017:203 [26]. 
22 See Commission (2008) (n 4). In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission states that ‘[the] proposal 
builds upon the strategy developed since the Amsterdam Treaty to combat discrimination and […] will help to 
further the fundamental rights of citizens, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’. 
23 Alexander Somek, Engineering Equality. An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2011), 69. 
 
24 For the EU’s statement of intent on a right to non-discrimination ‘in all areas of life’, as quoted in the 
heading of this sub-section, see European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions—Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment’ [2008] COM (2008) 0420 
final. On the ‘transformative function of EU equality law’, see Muir (n 3). See also Mark Bell, ‘The Principle 
of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 611–39. 
25 See Muir (n 3). 
26 See ibid. 
 
27 See Nobert Reich, ‘The Impact of the Non-Discrimination Principle on Private Autonomy’ in Dorota 
Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherhill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013). 
 
because it ultimately reshapes European societies through the direct injection of the non-
discrimination norm into micro-level interactions.28  
Although the protection from gender- and nationality-based discrimination in the sphere of 
employment already regulated horizontal private relationships early on, the 2000s equality laws 
extended horizontal regulation to more grounds within the broad realm of employment, and to the 
larger sphere of consumption of goods and services for gender and racial equality.29 This horizontal 
aspect becomes most visible when the principle of equal treatment encroaches upon private 
autonomy, notably freedom of contract.30 For instance, goods and services providers are forbidden to 
reject contractual partners because of their race or gender.31 Another obvious example is the 
obligation for a private employer to reasonably accommodate the disability of employees. The 
ensuing ‘privatization’ of the non-discrimination principle thus influences EU citizens’ behaviours, 
choices attitudes, and habits. It contributes to a long-term strategy of eliminating harmful stereotypes 
and prejudices, which perpetuate inequality. In this sense, non-discrimination has been proclaimed 
both a fundamental human right and a socially transformative principle in the EU. 
B. The promotion of a general principle of non-discrimination by the 
european judiciary 
(i) A historical engine in the field of non-discrimination law 
At the judicial level, the CJEU has historically been an active engine for the promotion of gender 
equality and non-discrimination based on nationality. It is the Court that breathed life into EU 
equality law.32 Efforts to transform European citizenship through equality in fact started with the 
direct horizontal effects recognized by the CJEU to Article 157 TFEU in the field of sex 
discrimination.33  
                                                 
28 See Muir (n 3), 1241 and 1253. Élise Muir links the horizontal dimension of the principle of non-
discrimination to a form of ‘inter-personal equality’. 
29 I use the adjectives ‘broad’ and ‘expanded’ to describe the spheres of ‘employment’ and ‘consumption’ as 
they cover an enlarged subset of areas such as social protection, professional training, healthcare, housing, etc. 
As already mentioned, the protection of race equality goes even further and includes education. 
30 A good example of this is the recent national judgment Gareth Lee v Colin McArthur, Karen McArthur and 
Ashers Baking Company Limited [2016] NICA 39. The Ashers Bakery Court of Appeal decision found 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a private business transaction between customers and 
business owners, in application of the Northern Ireland Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (NI) 
2006. The protection afforded is broader than Directive 2000/78/EC, which only covers employment. Such a 
broad anti-discrimination protection in the field of goods and services was intended in the Horizontal Proposal 
that is still under discussion at the Council. The Court of Appeal decision was however subsequently reversed 
by the UK Supreme Court, see Lee (Respondent) v Ashers Baking Company Ltd and others (Appellants) 
(Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 49. 
31 This, however, only applies to goods and services available to the public. 
32 Muir (n 3), 1241. 
33 Defrenne II [1976] (n 7) and Marshall [1986] (n 33) make clear that Treaty provisions—but not 
directives—can have direct horizontal effects in the field of sex discrimination.  
 
The Court pursued a similar strategy in the aftermath of the legislative reforms of the 
2000s. As the legislative protection against discrimination extended, the Court gave birth to a general 
principle of non-discrimination that has taken EU non-discrimination law beyond its strict economic 
origins.34 ‘From the narrow area of non-discrimination in the workplace’, it has evolved towards ‘a 
more embracing principle’, enabling a high level of protection across a wide range of situations and 
for a large constituency of rights-bearers.35 When reviewing the case law of the Court in the field of 
non-discrimination, it appears that the EU judiciary has mainly resorted to two instruments to uphold 
equality in the EU legal order: the constitutional precedence of general principles of fundamental 
rights and the principle of effectiveness. 
(ii) Constitutionalizing the right to non-discrimination: carving out a general principle 
in the name of fundamental human rights 
In retrospect, the Court’s post-2000 anti-discrimination jurisprudence upheld a double function for 
the principle of equality in the EU legal order. The CJEU progressively carved out a general 
principle of non-discrimination to which it granted de facto constitutional status even before the 
Charter acquired the status of primary law.36 Constitutionalizing the principle of equality 
strategically overlapped with, and complemented, the gradual shift of the equality discourse towards 
the language of fundamental rights. Equality hence embodied two functions that seemed to naturally 
complement each other, as both a general principle of EU law and a fundamental right. This 
rhetorical evolution at the judicial level furthered the Commission’s efforts to entrench equality, and 
European citizenship at large, in the realm of fundamental rights. 
At the outset, the CJEU adopted an activist stance on the question of what Muir calls 
the ‘transformative function’ of the principle of non-discrimination.37 In the much-commented and 
controversial Mangold decision in 2005, the Court recognized a general principle of non-
discrimination in respect of age.38 Remarkably, it granted direct effects to the said principle in a 
horizontal dispute between EU citizens, even though the transposition delay of Directive 2000/78/EC 
had not expired. This reversed the Court’s usual non-discrimination reasoning as the CJEU 
considered the ‘various international instruments and the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States’39 emphasized in the directive’s recital as the source of a general principle of non-
discrimination of constitutional standing, instead of deducing the prohibition of discrimination from 
the relevant directive. While the principle gave expression to the (yet to be transposed) directive, it 
sufficed alone to produce effects. 
                                                 
34 Sacha Prechal, ‘Achievements and Trends in EU Gender Equality Law’ (2005) 
<http://www.euroinfo.ee/malta/pdf/c4.pdf> (accessed 10 May 2016), 33. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Mangold [2005] (n 36) was decided in 2005 while the Charter acquired constitutional status in 2009. See 
Muir (n 3), 1244 and Reich (n 27), 256–60. 
 
37 Muir (n 3). 
 
38 Mangold (n 64). 
39 Ibid at [74]. 
 
This stance was repeated in 2010 in Kücükdeveci,40 another case of age 
discrimination, where the Court confirmed the existence of the general principle. Faced with a lack 
of direct applicability of the directive in horizontal disputes, the CJEU maintained the horizontal 
direct effects of the general principle of non-discrimination. This approach was subsequently 
confirmed in Dansk Industri in 2016.41 The Court first clarified that the general principle was 
horizontally and directly effective where the directive could not apply (ie in a horizontal dispute). 
Second, it explained that the general principle of non-discrimination, as an expression of the 
‘fundamental principle of equal treatment’, prevailed over other general principles of EU law such as 
legal certainty.42 The reasoning in the above-mentioned line of landmark cases therefore sanctioned 
the constitutional status of the general principle of non-discrimination in EU law, as well as its 
privileged position in the hierarchy of norms because of its nature as a fundamental right.43 As a 
consequence, the general principle of non-discrimination has displayed far-reaching transformative 
effects at the level of social interactions between EU citizens. 
One limitation to this jurisprudence is, however, that granting horizontal direct effects 
to the general principle of non-discrimination has so far only been used as an instrument to secure 
the uniform application of EU equality law. Concretely, these effects apply insofar as national 
legislation conflicts with EU law and needs to be dis-applied in a horizontal dispute, where directives 
do not enjoy direct effect.44 Hence, they can be described as ‘subsidiary’ horizontal direct effects: the 
general principle applies directly so long as the directive itself does not.45 This mechanism stretches 
the uniform application of EU non-discrimination law to private disputes, striking down illegal 
                                                 
40 C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GMBH & Co. KG EU:C:2010:21, [2010] ECR I-00365. 
41 C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI) v Succession Karsten Eigil Rasmussen [2016] EU:C:2016:278.  
See also C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV [2018] 
EU:C:2018:257 where the general principle of non-discrimination was discussed by the CJEU in relation to 
religion. This case was however decided after the finalization of this article and therefore cannot be discussed 
in detail here. 
42 Dansk Industri [2016], [26] (n 41). 
43 This might be due to its ‘structural and fundamental nature’ as both an expression of EU national 
constitutional traditions and a keystone in the history of EU integration. See Sune Klinge, ‘Dialogue or 
disobedience between the European Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish 
Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-principle’ (EU Law Analysis, 13 December 2016). 
 The importance and scope given to the general principle of non-discrimination therefore denotes the 
prominence given to individual equality rights over other legal concerns. See Urška Šadl and Sabine Mair 
‘Mutual Disempowerment: Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten 
Eigil Rasmussen and Case no. 15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for Ajos A/S v The estate left by A’ (2017) 
13(2) European Consitutional Law Review, 347. 
44 It is not certain, indeed, that the Court would have upheld the horizontal direct effect of the general 
principle in the absence of a national law explicitly conflicting with a directive.  
45 Giovanni Zaccaroni, ‘More on the horizontal direct effect of the principle of nondiscrimination on the 
ground of age: Dansk Industries (DI)’ (EU Law Analysis, 14 July 2016) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/07/more-on-horizontal-direct-effect-of.html> (accessed 10 October 
2016). 
 
provisions but also securing individual rights for EU citizens.46 However, after Dansk Industri 
(2016) and in view of the Danish Constitutional Court’s reaction, the boundaries between the 
exclusionary effects of the general principle of non-discrimination (ie the disapplication of state 
legislation) and the potential substitutionary effects linked to the de facto application of the non-
discrimination directive in a legal relationship between private parties (ie the alteration of private 
law-making) remain blurry.47 The scope of these horizontal direct effects being ambiguous, the 
frontiers of the transformative reach of equality as a constitutional fundamental right remain 
imprecise.48 
In parallel, the Court’s constitutionalization of the right to non-discrimination took on 
other forms. From a discursive perspective, it is interesting to note that the plurality of terminology 
of the beginnings was progressively substituted by a uniform language. From Mangold onwards, the 
terms used by the Court shifted from a ‘principle of equality’ to ‘a principle of equal treatment’ and 
then to a ‘principle of non-discrimination’.49 Although their content largely overlaps, it is the latter 
that is now clearly identified as a general principle of EU law. Furthermore, at the level of the CJEU 
too, the constitutional bedrock of the principle of non-discrimination became increasingly associated 
with the framework of fundamental and human rights. As early as 2006, the Court anchored equality 
in the subset of fundamental rights that ‘form an integral part of the general principles of Community 
Law’.50 
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Horizontal Direct Effect’ (2016) 1 European Papers, 643. 
48 It is disputed in the doctrinal debate whether horizontal direct effects only strike down national provisions 
or also create new rights per se. See (n 45) to (n 47). 
49 This finding relies on a systematic case law search conducted on the Curia database and refined through a 
qualitative analysis software. See Raphaële Xenidis, ‘Shaking the Normative Foundations of EU Equality 
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Paper (2017) available at 
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50 C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA. [2006] EU:C:2006:456, [56]. However, 
contrary to Mangold [2005] (n 35), the Court does not use the fundamental rights basis to recognize 
protection: ‘it does not follow from this that the scope of Directive 2000/78 should be extended by analogy 
beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof.’ 
 
The emphasis put in judicial language on the nature of equality as a fundamental right 
has been particularly strong from 2009 onwards, as the general principle of non-discrimination in its 
multiple forms has been increasingly invoked in association with the Charter. For instance, a search 
of the case law related to Directives 2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC reveals that from 2010 to 2017, 
nineteen cases deployed the general principle of non-discrimination together with Article 21 of the 
Charter, which prohibits discrimination.51 The first of them, Kücükdeveci (2010), recalls that the 
‘principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age […] must be regarded as a general principle of 
European Union law’ and that ‘the Charter […] is to have the same legal value as the Treaties’, 
notably Article 21.52 In FOA (2014), the CJEU recognized that ‘the fundamental rights which form 
an integral part of the general principles of EU law include the general principle of non-
discrimination’.53 This shift was also confirmed in the widely-discussed Test-Achats (2011) case, in 
which the Court used Article 21 and 23 of the Charter as the main normative sources to strike down a 
provision of EU law deemed discriminatory.54 It declared invalid a legislative exemption contained 
in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113/EC allowing gender-differentiated insurance premiums and 
benefits precisely because it derogated from the fundamental right to, and principle of, equal 
treatment. Finally, in Glatzel (2014), Chatzi v Ypourgos Oikonomikon (2016), and Fries (2017), the 
Court also confirmed that Article 20 of the Charter, dealing with equality before the law, was an 
expression of the fundamental nature of the general principle of equal treatment.55  
Hence the constitutional status of the right to non-discrimination, already enshrined in 
Article 19 TFEU, has progressively been furthered not only because of its recognition as a general 
principle, but also because of its anchoring in the Charter. The framing of the principle of non-
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discrimination as a fundamental human right therefore provides a double constitutional anchor, 
which reinforces the transformative ambit of equality in the EU. 
(iii) Guaranteeing the effectiveness of the right not to be discriminated against 
The Court’s jurisprudence was a game-changer insofar as it provided a bold and extensive 
interpretation of the directives so as to ensure effectiveness.56 Several jurisprudential innovations, 
along with the Mangold line of case law, show how the principle of effectiveness was used to 
advance non-discrimination both as a right and a core principle of social life. Interestingly, this is 
particularly true where non-discrimination served to ensure people’s participation in the labour and 
consumption market. 
First, as the previous section has already made clear, the horizontal direct effects of 
the general principle of non-discrimination recognized in Mangold largely contributed to the 
advancement of the rights contained in the new directive.57 Further, the Court has also taken into 
account the spirit of the law, either by giving weight to secondary objectives expressed in the recitals 
of the directives, Council recommendations, and policy frameworks, in particular when related to 
employment, or by using international standards to back the effective interpretation of non-
discrimination rights. 
One of the most eloquent examples is CHEZ (2015), where the Court invoked the 
Convention together with case law from the ECtHR, as well as the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination in order to interpret Directive 2000/43/EC.58 The 
CJEU has made an even more important use of the UNCRPD, to which the EU has been a party 
since 2009. For instance, in recent case law the CJEU has tended, in light of the UNCRPD, to 
endorse a social model of disability as put forward in international law in order to guarantee the 
effective participation of workers living with disabilities in the labour market.59 In Odar (2012) and 
in the joined cases Ring and HK (2013), the Court’s reasoning fostered ‘the effectiveness of … 
[measures that] … take account of the specific difficulties and risks faced by severely disabled 
workers’ and the ‘full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an 
equal basis with other workers’.60 In FOA (2014), the principle of effectiveness determined the 
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Court’s understanding of obesity as a disability when it hinders a worker’s participation in the labour 
market.61 Finally, in Milkova (2017), the principle of effectiveness also served to reassert that 
‘Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/78 is to authorise specific measures aimed at effectively eliminating 
or reducing actual instances of inequality affecting people with disabilities’.62 
The principle of effectiveness has also served to adapt the procedural rules of non-
discrimination jurisprudence to ensure the continuity of equality as a social value. For instance in 
Feryn (2008), the Court took a major step in establishing a presumption of direct racial 
discrimination even in the absence of identified victims.63 It considered that public racist statements 
emanating from a major Belgian company deterred potential racial minority workers from applying 
for open positions and thus shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant.64 The same principle 
applied in ACCEPT (2013), where the patron of a Romanian football team had publicly made 
homophobic statements in the media.65 The CJEU considered that there was no need for victims to 
be identified to establish a presumption of discrimination and concluded that the national court may 
shift the burden of proof onto the defendant.66 These two cases also show another application of the 
principle of effectiveness. In ACCEPT (2013) the Court decided that symbolic sanctions against the 
football club would be inappropriate and underlined, in both cases, that sanctions should instead be 
‘effective, proportional and dissuasive’ to be compatible with EU non-discrimination law.67  
In addition, the principle of effectiveness has been used to interpret the rules of 
evidence in a manner that would ensure the validity of the principle of non-discrimination. In 
Meister68 (2012), the Court relied on the principle of effectiveness to find that an employer’s refusal 
to disclose information pertaining to a recruitment process could count towards the establishment of 
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however, inconceivable that a refusal of disclosure by the defendant, in the context of establishing such facts, 
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deprive that provision of its effectiveness’ (emphasis added). However, the principle of effectiveness is 
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a presumption of discrimination.69 In fact, in this case of alleged employment discrimination on the 
multiple bases of age, gender, and ethnic origin, the absence of such evidence would otherwise 
undermine the effectiveness of non-discrimination law, notably because ‘[d]iscrimination has the 
reputation of being particularly hard to substantiate’.70 
Finally, the principle of effectiveness has also intervened to secure effective 
definitions of protected groups. Notably, in Coleman (2008) and CHEZ (2015), the Court pushed for 
effectiveness through recognizing that so-called ‘discrimination by association’ amounted to 
unlawful discrimination.71 In Coleman (2008), it found that discriminating against a worker because 
she needs accommodation of her working conditions to be able to take care of her disabled son 
constitutes ‘discrimination by association’ on grounds of disability.72 In CHEZ (2015), the CJEU 
identified racist discrimination ‘by association’ against a member of the Bulgarian ethnic majority. 
This apparent contradiction arose because the victim was harmed by a discriminatory policy 
targeting an entire neighbourhood based on racist stereotyping against a Roma minority. The CJEU 
offered an in-depth contextual analysis of the role of racist prejudices in the perpetuation of 
discrimination and inequality and rebutted dangerous essentialist interpretations of the concept of 
ethnicity, thereby securing an effective interpretation of Directive 2000/43/EC. 
These examples show how the principle of effectiveness has recently ensured a more 
far-reaching interpretation of the prohibition to discriminate, at least where it affected the 
participation of EU citizens in the labour and consumption market. In some instances, the Court did 
not shy away from punctually interfering, sometimes bluntly, with member states’ autonomy to 
enforce the full range of rights deriving from the Charter and the general principle of non-
discrimination and to ensure that exceptions are only strict and narrow.73 Through its decisions and 
language, the Court has at times displayed a certain willingness to propel equality towards both a 
fundamental human right and a core social norm structuring public and private relationships in the 
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EU.74 At the same time, these efforts have not been uniform.75 This inconstancy can be understood as 
the reflection of a fundamental tension at the heart of the principle of non-discrimination. 
III. What substance for non-discrimination law between market-
oriented and human rights-driven concerns? 
As demonstrated above, efforts have been made both at the political and at the judicial level to 
requalify the principle of non-discrimination as a fundamental human right. This section takes 
Westen’s proposition that equality is ‘a “form” for stating moral and legal propositions whose 
substance originates elsewhere’ and ‘a “form” of discourse with no substantive content of its own’ 
seriously.76 The next paragraphs demonstrate how, through shifting the framing of equality, the EU 
anchored its reformative enterprise within a broader disruptive narrative. Through opposing the 
Union’s ‘new’ human rights mandate to its more traditional mission of promoting economic 
integration, this narrative fulfils both a legitimizing and a modernizing function.77 However, the 
dichotomy constructed between these two overarching normative frames is artificial and, in fact, the 
EU non-discrimination system cannot be understood through this binary opposition. Rather, it 
constitutes a hybrid locus, which seems characterized by its fluctuating substance. 
A. Transforming non-discrimination law? A disruptive narrative 
(i) The right to non-discrimination: a cornerstone of the EU human rights agenda 
The story of the principle of non-discrimination is clearly rooted in an instrumental conception of 
equal treatment as a means of economic integration. It is well known in fact that EU non-
discrimination law is not born out of a genuine effort to protect the fundamental human right to 
equality. Rather, its roots lie in the willingness to eliminate distortions of competition to realize a 
single market. In order to integrate national markets and to ensure freedom of circulation for 
workers, a prohibition to discriminate based on nationality and sex was inserted in the Treaty.78 
Hence, non-discrimination rights primarily served the indirect purpose of securing economic 
participation and growth.79 
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77 See e.g. Erving Goffman, Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience (Boston, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). 
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Yet, as the first section of this article showed, the reforms of the 2000s reflect an 
alternative rationale. Translated into the language of human rights, non-discrimination law became 
increasingly embedded in the broader framework of equality and promoted as one of the fundamental 
values of the EU. In the words of CJEU Judge Prechal herself, ‘the rationales underlying equality 
and non-discrimination’ shifted ‘away from the economic integration motives towards the 
recognition of equality and non-discrimination as a self-standing fundamental right’.80 Other 
commentators spoke, as early as 2002, of a new guiding rationale in EU non-discrimination law, with 
concepts like ‘fairness, autonomy, human dignity and respect for human rights’ as well as ‘the 
creation of a better society’ as leitmotivs.81 This framing exercise did not only take place at the 
legislative and jurisprudential levels as exposed above, but also translated in a new political 
narrative. 
After the human rights project had been put aside for decades in order to privilege 
economic integration, constructing non-discrimination law as a pillar of the EU’s protection of 
fundamental rights was part of an overarching discursive strategy aimed at giving a new impetus to 
the Union’s mandate in a moment of stagnation.82 As integration was running out of steam at the 
beginning of the 2000s after important achievements in the single market, the human rights narrative 
permitted the Union to regain legitimacy. It seems that the EU found in ‘the language surrounding 
human rights […] a powerful language with which to express political claims’.83 By downplaying the 
market integration rationale and using the great purchasing power of the human rights discourse, EU 
decision makers could at the same time respond to internal challenges, keep up with international 
standards, and restore the Union’s image. The new emphasis on the EU as a promoter of rights 
manifested itself in two concrete ways. Externally, the EU’s role in international security and peace 
building missions increased.84 Internally, strengthening and reframing the historical protection 
against discrimination was an ideal project to respond to the inner and outer legitimacy challenges 
faced by the EU at the time.  
Since the 1980s racist and xenophobic movements had in fact become more and more 
vociferous in the EU. The long-term work of coalitions of European NGOs fighting against racism 
and social exclusion, among which were the Starting Line Group and the Social Platform, raised 
broad awareness about this problematic context. These initiatives led to a Treaty reform 
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constitutionalizing the fundamental right not to be discriminated against in the form of Article 13 
TEC in 1997, and later to the adoption of Directive 2000/43/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC in 2000.85 
The Race Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Framework Directive were approved 
quickly in light of the political background.86 Triggering this political mobilization was the entry of 
the populist and far-right party FPÖ led by controversial politician Jörg Haider in the Austrian 
governmental coalition in 2000, after it had gained a high level of votes at the 1999 general elections. 
Fearing violations of human rights, the centre-left majority sitting at the EU Council of Ministers at 
the time of the discussions embarked upon a series of legal reforms and political measures to 
introduce safeguards for fundamental rights, despite the original resistance of Member States.87 The 
Union’s affirmation of its human rights mandate thus constituted the European governments’ 
emergency response to the threats posed by the rise of right-wing extremism.88 In the context of this 
legitimacy crisis, the fight against discrimination represented a symbolic opportunity for the EU to 
show unity and to push forward a form of de minimis European citizenship, in which the human 
rights frame dealt as the lowest common value denominator. 
Pressure to increase attention to human rights at the EU level also came from 
international fora, where initiatives to improve the protection of vulnerable groups multiplied in the 
2000s. Global or regional concerns like the ageing of the population and thus the need to protect 
older workers, growing international attention to the rights of people living with disabilities, and 
international discussions around multiple inequalities also explain the readiness of EU institutions to 
reform non-discrimination law.89 For instance, at the dawn of the 2000s negotiations over the yet-to-
become CRPD were called for by international NGOs in the UN. The committees enforcing already 
existing conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) also actively issued new general 
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recommendations to strengthen the international protection of minorities against discrimination.90 A 
final example is the adoption of the Charter in 2000, which matches the ECHR in the field of non-
discrimination provisions and thus further anchored the principle of non-discrimination within both a 
European and an international human rights framework. Hence, in less than two decades, the EU 
both consolidated and reframed its non-discrimination system, responding to both internal and 
external pressure. On the one hand, EU institutions, seeking legitimacy and a revival of integration, 
could exploit a window of opportunity created both by the political climate and by the activism of 
the EU civil society. On the other hand, the Union found in non-discrimination law an adequate 
response to the globalization of international human rights discourses.91 These examples show how 
equality has been used as a ‘form’ or a vehicle for the Union’s evolving normative and political 
agenda.92 
(ii) Normative tensions in the substance of the principle of equality 
The fundamental rights frame, despite its relative newness, has established itself as one of the main 
normative foundations of the European equality law project today. It challenged the narrower 
historical framing of non-discrimination law as a catalyst for market integration and a mere de facto 
safeguard for workers’ social rights. Non-discrimination thereby became a right – the legal basis for 
individuals to claim equal treatment in public and private interactions – and a core dimension of EU 
citizenship, that is, a strong legitimizing narrative. This evolution, presented as a transformation of 
the normative foundations of EU equality law, carries with it a rhetoric of disruption, which rests on 
a series of discursive dichotomies. This section exposes some of the normative frictions and clashes 
that these binary oppositions seem to create.  
While the principle of non-discrimination was historically instrumental to the Union’s 
primarily economic mandate, the right to non-discrimination is presented as genuine, imperative, and 
fundamental in what Somek calls the ‘newspeak’ of the EU institutions.93 Market harmonization 
seems to have been substituted at the centre of European integration by concerns over human 
diversity and differences, at least at the symbolic level.94 Given the mandate conferred on the EU, 
non-discrimination rights as guaranteed by EU law mainly span over the labour and consumption 
markets, which contrasts with the traditionally assumed universality of human rights. If non-
discrimination indeed became a right that human beings possess qua humans, then we should 
observe an imperative principle with per se validity, or even a ‘trump’ to be given priority over other 
                                                 
90 For instance the CERD issued a General recommendation No. 27 on discrimination against Roma, a 
General Recommendation No. 26 on compensation for victims of racial discrimination, and a General 
recommendation No. 25 on gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination in 2000, the CEDAW adopted 
a General recommendation No. 24 on discrimination against women in health-related matters in 1999, while 
the Human Rights Committee adopted a General Comment No. 28 in 2000 on the equality of rights between 
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politico-social objectives.95 This definition contrasts with the utilitarian understanding, promoted at 
the start of the EU integration process, of non-discrimination rights as functional vehicles enforcing a 
distinct set of (liberal) socio-political preferences. In addition, setting social protection safeguards in 
the form of non-discrimination rights necessarily restricts the private autonomy of market actors, 
which is a funding element of liberal capitalist societies. Hence, the fundamental right to equality 
collides with concerns of economic efficiency, party autonomy, freedom of contract and the right to 
differentiate. However, non-discrimination law’s horizontality, that is its capacity to shape private 
interactions and thus to constitute a structuring norm in social relations, simultaneously goes beyond 
the traditional grounding of human rights in public law and vertical relationships.96 Non-
discrimination law thus is at the centre of competing normative frames, each of which bears its own 
symbolic, discursive, and ideological allegiances.97 
Second, these apparent dichotomies create a cognitive dissonance between the internal 
and external dimensions of the EU non-discrimination legal system. Internally, the ‘transformative 
function’ of the principle of non-discrimination lies in its structuring power over daily private 
relationships within the scope of the Union’s competences, that is mainly the labour and 
consumption markets.98 Hence, economic interactions constitute the substance of the right to non-
discrimination. Externally, however, the transformation narrative rests on a rhetoric of liberation 
from market logics through the creation of a genuine human right. The substantive content of 
equality, understood as a ‘form’ and a ‘discourse’ in the sense of Westen, has therefore changed over 
time, leading to the coexistence and competition of two overarching, conceptually and ideologically 
loaded, normative frames.99 Is this apparent bipolarity reconcilable? Examining the substance of the 
new non-discrimination rights granted to EU citizens in the 2000s reveals that understanding the 
reforms as a radical disruption is fraught with over-simplifications and false dichotomies.   
(iii) Equality as a hybrid vehicle for distinct normative projects 
The apparent contradictions in the evolution of the EU equality model make it difficult to provide a 
sound theoretical account of the principle of equality in the EU. The construction of the EU non-
discrimination system indicates that equality is a deeply hybrid principle of EU law, that cannot be 
ordered within such a binary structure or entirely subsumed within either a pure economic or a 
human rights driven rationale. Instead, the principle of non-discrimination and its different ‘layers’ 
are a perfect embodiment of the very normative plurality of the EU project itself. Non-discrimination 
law is in fact the result of three distinct evolutions. The early economic rationale was complemented 
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over time by social rights related for instance to social security,  pregnancy and maternity.100 The 
spectrum of non-discrimination law was subsequently enlarged to offer fundamental rights to all 
citizens independently of their participation in the labour market.101 However, in lieu of a neat 
transformation, it is rather a pragmatic accumulation that forms the normative core of non-
discrimination law today. In fact, the 2008 proposal for a Horizontal Directive is described as 
‘consistent with … the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the objectives of the EU Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion Process’ as well as being designed ‘to further the fundamental rights 
of citizens, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’.102 This framing brings together three 
conceptions of the principle of equality that are presented as a coherent set of goals but are at first 
sight not entirely congruent. This section explores some of the manifestations and articulations of 
this hybridity. 
The first site of hybridity lies in the economic dimension of the principle of equality. 
It instrumentally enables what Somek calls the ‘transnational substantive economic due process’ in a 
system where different national social models co-exist in the absence of a transnational welfare 
provider to ensure common standards of social protection.103 In doing so, it favours free economic 
competition. At the same time, non-discrimination rules also restrict economic freedom, ‘creeping 
into European contract law’, to guarantee minimum standards of protection of the fundamental 
human right to equality.104 This is a first illustration of the power of symbolic ‘reconciliation’ of the 
principle of non-discrimination, in which two apparently contradictory propositions find a ground to 
co-exist.105 
The origins of, and justifications for, equality protection also reveal the pragmatic co-
existence of two distinct normative projects. While the ‘old’ grounds—gender and nationality—arose 
from market-related concerns, the ‘new’ grounds—race, religion, sexual orientation, age, and 
disability—have mainly been supported by human rights driven justifications, the valorization of 
diversity and the promotion of an inclusive society from the outset. This said, the protection from 
age- and disability-based discrimination, notably, responds explicitly to hybrid concerns.106 In fact, 
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beyond the genuine necessity to protect young and ageing populations and persons living with 
disabilities, guaranteeing access to labour to large segments of the Union’s population instrumentally 
contributes to the common objective of raising employment rates in Europe.107 The same applies in 
principle to the protection against discrimination based on race, religion and sexual orientation.108 
The advocacy strategy of the Starting Line Group in fact actively exploited this normative hybridity 
by framing non-discrimination law as instrumental to the Community’s plans to complete the 
internal market through removing obstacles to the freedom of movement of persons, goods and 
services and capital. This double framing pragmatically avoided the non-discrimination project being 
‘entirely locked into the common market logic’ by, at the same time, ‘appeal[ing] to overall human 
rights and equality commitments’.109 Vice versa, the protection of gender equality is now understood 
as an end in itself. What we observe is thus a double-sided language, framing two traditionally 
opposed objectives as actually complementary. 
Third, hybridity is also manifest in the differences of material scope of the various 
directives, as well as their pools of addressees, which give an inflection to one or the other aims of 
the principle of non-discrimination. When the pool of addressees of non-discrimination rights is 
limited to workers, the focus of equality seems to be placed on labour market integration. In this 
perspective, the social rights that non-discrimination law creates for workers as a counterpart of 
economic integration can be seen as functional or instrumental. On the contrary, when the pool is 
broader and the law purports to create genuine rights for all, the human rights based understanding of 
equality seems more evident. Despite a great majority of grounds still being exclusively protected 
within the realm of the labour market today, partially extending the scope of the law to consumption 
has allowed some categories of EU citizens, independently of their participation in the labour market, 
to benefit from some degree of non-discrimination protection in their daily life, for instance when 
looking for housing, health care or even education in some instances.110 
Hence, the EU equality model is multidimensional and fulfils the double objective of 
further integrating the single market and strengthening the set of rights linked to EU citizenship, at 
times vested with instrumentality, and at times endorses the imperative language of human rights. 
The symbolic disruption presented by the rights-based reframing of EU non-discrimination law 
therefore fades when looking beyond artificial discursive dichotomies. The question that arises next 
is what there is to see beneath the surface of these imaginaries and discourses of equality. The 
following section takes a closer look at the flesh and bones of the principle of non-discrimination in 
EU law and its mechanics. 
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B. Beyond misleading dichotomies: non-discrimination law as a pragmatic 
assemblage 
In spite of its normative plurality, the principle of non-discrimination is still characterized by a 
surprising degree of coherence. This is because, under the specific condition of the Union’s liberal 
mandate, the transformative nature of the principle of equality rests precisely on the accommodation 
of seemingly opposed frames and rationales.111 The following sub-sections deconstruct the rhetorical 
opposition between market-based and rights-based visions of equality and highlight their actual 
complementarity through the prism of participation. Looking at the substance of European 
citizenship reveals the centrality of economic participation and market mechanisms in the specific 
form and the distribution of the set of equality rights guaranteed by the EU. 
(i) Equality through the market: fostering participation through distributive safeguards 
The reason why different normative projects are able to co-exist (albeit not always peacefully) within 
the same legal principle of non-discrimination is the distributive scope of the EU liberal non-
discrimination model. Participation is the keystone of that system and the market its centre of 
gravity. Because market participation covers an important part of social interactions, namely work 
and consumption of goods and services, ensuring non-discrimination in the market is an important 
step towards equality. This is all the more relevant in the EU context, where market relations 
constitute a considerable share of the fields regulated by the Union. As Somek shows, in the 
framework of the Union’s liberal mandate ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine a principle that would be better 
suited to reconciling solidarity and competitiveness than the principle of equality of opportunity’.112 
Tellingly, the Lisbon Strategy demands that anti-discrimination law boosts economic efficiency and 
contemporaneously ensures what EU institutions call ‘solidarity’.113 
In substance, this model of non-discrimination law is based on a range of distributive 
safeguards and could be described, in the words of Micklitz, as ‘access justice’.114 It takes the form 
of a bundle of rights facilitating economic and social participation.115 Two core features of this 
system are its focus on individual participation and its opportunity-based structure. First, it offers an 
individualistic corrective to unbalanced market opportunities.116 Non-discriminatory access to the 
market ensures minimum economic, and therefore a form of social, participatory safeguards for EU 
citizens—as workers but also in certain cases as consumers and even at times in education.117 This 
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system comes relatively close to what McCrudden calls an individual justice model118, in which non-
discrimination is a precondition for individual social participation, a core dimension of equality.119 
Second, the ‘access’ model predominantly promotes equality as a process, mainly through symmetry, 
individual fairness, and the elimination of harmful and illegitimate considerations against certain 
groups within decision making. The default rule is, as inscribed in the Treaties, ‘equal 
opportunities’.120 EU non-discrimination law in fact mainly focuses on equality of opportunities for 
disadvantaged citizens to ‘rea[p] off the benefits of the market’ and participate in the European 
economy.121 
Albeit often called a formal equality model, the EU anti-discrimination system goes 
further than ‘blind’ or merely ‘procedural’ formal equality as it provides for more substantive 
opportunities. It comes closer to Rawls’ liberal idea of ‘fair equality of opportunity’.122 Provisions 
such as reasonable accommodation and the prohibition of indirect discrimination, to name just a few 
examples, punctually tilt the balance towards a more substantive form of equality. Article 157(4) 
TFEU authorizing member States to adopt or maintain positive action measures within certain limits 
in the name of ‘full equality in practice’ even lends some outcome-oriented and collective traits to 
the EU equality model. While its core substance is market participation, some dimensions of the EU 
equality model like gender mainstreaming obligations foster participation beyond market-related 
issues.123 The substance of equality in the EU context is therefore hybrid and escapes neat theoretical 
classification.  
In spite of the disruptive reframing observable at the symbolic level, EU equality law 
is deeply reconciliatory. Because the EU non-discrimination model reframed distributive 
opportunities as rights, it displaced the centre of gravity of the principle of equality from social 
protection and redistributive justice mechanisms, as traditionally understood in the context of 
national welfare systems, to economic participatory chances. Through expelling positive socio-
economic rights and redistributive justice outside the field of EU law and pushing them into the 
domain of national politics, the human rights equality frame could be fitted to the pre-existing 
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market-based non-discrimination frame within a liberal setting.124 Symptomatically, the Union’s 
equality system substituted the vertical redistribution-based dimension that traditionally characterizes 
national equality politics by reinforcing the horizontal dimension, centred on recognition and 
distributive interactions. By affecting citizens’ relationships at the micro-level, the principle of 
equality is expected to progressively reshape deeply entrenched behavioural, cultural, and symbolic 
structures of discrimination in the long run. Restrictions of economic freedom in the name of 
equality support market integration and growth through limiting inefficient market choices, for 
instance based on false gender stereotypes or prejudice linked to national or ethnic origin. Switching 
from a micro to a macro perspective, EU non-discrimination law is meant to modify social relations, 
and, in a nutshell, the substance of EU citizenship.125  
As a consequence, even though seen in opposition, the rights-based understanding of 
non-discrimination law and the market-based rationales come together in a pragmatic assemblage 
that reveals a surprisingly high degree of complementarity. The mechanism of participatory 
opportunities serves the double aim of furthering the European economic integration project and 
advancing European citizenship. This very hybridity, however, entails important frictions and limits. 
They concern the mechanics of allocation of distributive opportunities as non-discrimination rights 
and their reach outside the realm of market participation, questions to which we now turn, as well as 
the coherence of the equality principle, which will be the subject of the last section of this article. 
(ii) Equality before the market: providing recognition through an identity-based 
allocation of non-discrimination rights 
One of the most tangible effects of the framing of the 2000 non-discrimination law reforms through 
the language of human rights is the reorganization of the mechanics of allocation of non-
discrimination rights around the concept of social identity.126 Against the background of what 
Kennedy calls the ‘third globalization’, distributive safeguards that used to take the form of welfare 
programmes at national level were reframed around the category of identity in the EU context. The 
multiplication of non-discrimination norms and their organization around identity categories in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam also converged with the liberal human rights frame promoted in international 
legal and political fora.127 The equality paradigm shifted from redistributive and social policies to 
politics of rights focused on the recognition of social diversity. EU non-discrimination law took on 
the features of an identity-based framework of protection, allocating equality rights using selected 
social statuses and memberships as markers of marginalization. Hence, while the substance of non-
discrimination rights is made of distributive opportunities, the recognition paradigm informs the 
grammar of their allocation.  
Framing equality as a fundamental right promotes the ideal of a ‘difference-friendly 
world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price for equal 
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respect’.128 However, the kind of recognition offered by the EU equality model seems more limited. 
Münch speaks of the ‘premarket activation’ of structurally disadvantaged individuals so that they can 
benefit from the removal of market barriers to the same extent as active citizens.129 This ex ante 
policy, he claims, should target ‘the collectively shared identity of minorities’ which is ‘left as the 
last reason for discrimination’ today.130 Although this latter affirmation is doubtful in light of the 
systemic role played by material, economic, and class-based inequalities, Münch points at the limits 
of the recognition work performed by the EU anti-discrimination system. The accommodation of 
diversity and social difference is only understood as a precondition for disadvantaged groups to 
access distributive opportunities. In fact, the recognition secured by EU equality law does not equate 
a form of ‘constitutional multiculturalism that does not protect individuals’ rights to freedom but 
rather the cultural identities of groups’.131 Even if the 2000 reforms departed from a mere 
individualistic concept of equality to punctually provide for an increased understanding of its 
collective dimension, the recognition of disadvantaged social identities remains intrinsically 
correlated to individual market access rights.132 EU non-discrimination law is therefore 
‘instrumentalist’, as opposed to ‘collectivist’, as it uses the group as a basis to protect the rights its 
members possess qua individuals.133  
In effect, EU anti-discrimination law is marked by this tension between collective and 
individual recognition. On the one hand, the EU equality system is adversarial: the non-
discrimination rights linked to certain group identities and the social rights deriving from 
participation in the labour market are mostly individually justiciable and enforceable.134 On the 
other, the ban on indirect discrimination also addresses the collective and systemic nature of 
inequality as a structural phenomenon often arising from stereotypes, prejudices, and bias.135 The 
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CJEU for instance showed a willingness to depart from exclusively individualistic equality reasoning 
by recognizing the importance of structural discrimination.136 Displacing the focus from legislation 
and adjudication to enforcement also highlighted the roots of individual impediments in collective 
patterns of disadvantage.137 For instance, national equality bodies have favoured more collective 
responses to structural discrimination through awareness-raising campaigns, monitoring work, 
contextualized policy recommendations, and research at national level. The mandates of equality 
bodies often even go beyond the minimum standards set by EU law in terms of grounds of 
discrimination covered and strategies for action, for instance the promotion of positive action 
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measures. The structural effects of EU equality law however remain limited as its binding core is 
mainly made up of negative, by contrast to positive, obligations not to discriminate.138 
The kind of recognition offered by the EU anti-discrimination model presents two 
further limits. The principle of non-discrimination offers, as a corollary to distributive opportunities, 
an intersubjective form of recognition.139 It aims to secure ‘equal respect [for] all participants’ in the 
(labour) market and to ‘ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem’.140 Non-discrimination 
rules should first and foremost influence the decision-making processes of individual agents. In the 
long run, however, the idea is that they would reshape ‘institutionalized patterns of cultural value’ 
and curb the symbolic systems of inequality and stigmatization that underpin unequal distribution 
and other material manifestations of discrimination.141 The recognition dimension of anti-
discrimination law thus aims to not only impact the micro level of individual interactions, but also, in 
the long term, the macro structural level, through changing ‘cultural patterns of interpretation and 
evaluation’ and the social appreciation of status-based differences.142  However, it remains unclear 
whether and how equality as recognition will spread from the micro intersubjective level to the 
macro structure. Doubts also arise regarding its effects on recognition beyond distributive structures. 
The recognition of disadvantaged identity memberships is also limited to some 
ascriptive categories. The selection of these protected criteria is neither grounded in a clear rationale 
nor are these categories defined in the directives.143 EU non-discrimination law rather partly 
absorbed the vulnerability rhetoric of international human rights discourses. It can be considered 
alluring as a palliative to the deficiencies of distributive mechanisms, but it also risks essentializing 
the disadvantages linked to certain social divisions. Current EU legislation leaves out other vectors 
of discrimination such as social, economic or family status, cultural capital or physical appearance, 
to name just a few examples.144 Most Member States as well as the Charter prohibit a larger number 
of grounds of discrimination.145 However, the Union has so far refused to use the Charter as a 
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139 See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-philosophical Exchange 
(London: Verso Books, 2004), 36. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See ibid, 29. See also Iyiola Solanke, Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-discrimination Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
142 Fraser and Honneth (n 139), 20. 
143 Identity-based social movements in the 1990s drew attention to the marginalization of certain segments of 
the population by the prevailing socio-political organization and their demands shaped the very selection of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in EU law. On the selection of grounds, see e.g. Erica Howard ‘The Case 
for a Considered Hierarchy of Discrimination Grounds in EU Law’ (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 4. 
 
144 For a criticism of the limiting principle of anti-discrimination law, see Solanke (n 141). 
 
145 The Charter includes fifteen protected grounds in its Article 21: language, social origin, genetic features, 
birth, property, political or other opinion, membership in a national minority, sexual orientation, disability, 
gender, race and ethnic origin, religion, age, and nationality. 
Socio-economic status, for instance, is a prohibited ground of discrimination in Belgium where 
‘wealth/income’ and ‘social origin’ are protected grounds; in Croatia where ‘social origin’, ‘education’, 
‘property’, and ‘social status’ are protected grounds; in Hungary where ‘social origin’ and ‘financial status’ 
 
touchstone for the application of the general principle of non-discrimination despite its primary law 
status.146 In FOA for instance, the CJEU explicitly refused to extend the number of grounds protected 
in the directives to the full list contained in Article 21 of the Charter.147 Finally, the current equal 
protection system is inconsistent across its scope ratione materiae and ratione personae so that 
different protected categories enjoy different degrees of recognition, as the third section of this 
article will further clarify. 
EU non-discrimination law is therefore a hybrid system that accommodates both 
external pressure for the protection of human rights and the internal diversity of the EU pluralistic 
legal, social, and economic order.148 It solves social conflicts by promoting economic growth, 
individual freedom and access to the labour and consumption markets through the language of rights 
and identity. ‘[R]ecognizing and managing difference’ through non-discrimination law is both an 
instrument of self-legitimization promoting the EU legal regime as a global provider of human rights 
protection, and a central element of a justice model that is constrained by the liberal imperative of the 
EU economic project in a time of crisis and austerity. By reconciling these different normative 
objectives, the anti-discrimination principle however falls short of the ideal of substantive equality 
promoted by EU institutions, and notably the Commission, in political discourses.149 
(iii) Equality beyond the market? Non-discrimination vs. equality 
A truly transformative principle should aim to foster autonomy and equality beyond the market and 
distributive mechanisms, throughout the diversity of social structures. Substantive equality has been 
given various definitions—the one advanced by Fredman includes four dimensions: political 
participation, economic participation and the redress of disadvantage, identity recognition and the 
accommodation of diversity, and finally the end of violence and stigma.150 Such a conception of 
equality goes far beyond the sphere of economic participation and the mere economic agency of 
citizens. It also exceeds the ambitions of EU anti-discrimination law by far.151  
                                                 
are also protected; in Bulgaria where protection includes ‘education’, ‘social status’, and ‘property status’; in 
Austria where the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ‘class’, ‘estate or property’, and ‘social 
standing’; in Cyprus where the constitution covers ‘social descent’, ‘wealth’, and ‘social class’; in Latvia 
where ‘property’ and ‘social status’ are covered; in Malta (‘social origin’ and ‘property’); under related 
criteria in Romania (‘social status’ and ‘belonging to a disadvantaged group’), Italy and Spain (under ‘social 
condition’), Portugal (‘economic situation’ and ‘social condition’), Slovenia (‘social standing’ and ‘economic 
situation’ and ‘education’) and Slovakia (‘property’ and ‘social origin’); as well as partly in France where it 
appears under the prohibited criterion of ‘particular vulnerability resulting from a known or apparent 
economic situation’ and in Denmark, Estonia, and Lithuania where it respectively appears under ‘social 
origin’ and ‘social status’. In addition, ‘social origin’ and ‘property’ are also prohibited grounds under the 
article 21 of the EU Charter as well as under the ECHR. 
146 Micklitz (2011) (n 114), 18. 
147 FOA  [2014], [36]–[37] (n 53). This practice has for instance been endorsed by the Canadian Supreme 
Court. 
148 Kennedy (n 94), 65. 
 
149 See Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal’ (2010) Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 08/10, 10. 
150 Fredman, ‘Substantive equality revisited’ (n 119). 
 
 
The evolution of EU law over the last eighteen years nonetheless denotes efforts to 
push the principle of equality in this direction, beyond labour and consumption in the strictest sense, 
in domains such as education, social protection, and health care.152 Considered broadly, the notion of 
goods and services could also include the media and advertising, where the prohibition to spread 
racist prejudices would apply under directive 2000/43/EC.153 Given the influence of the media in 
shaping common social (discriminatory) attitudes, this protection would affect society far beyond 
market-based interactions and would be an important step towards fighting unfair stereotyping, 
stigmatization, and the diffusion of discriminatory narratives, through a wide propagation of the 
principle of non-discrimination in representations, images and cognitive patterns of interpretation 
and association.154 Initiatives in this sense have also been taken beyond EU non-discrimination law. 
For instance, the Council decision on fighting against racism and xenophobia through criminal 
sanctions prohibits several forms of breach of equal dignity such as public incitation to, 
dissemination, condoning or denial of racist and xenophobic hatred and violence.155 In the long term, 
profoundly transforming the symbolic structures underlying and perpetuating discrimination through 
combating stigmatization and violence can considerably advance equal dignity in the Union. This 
transformation must go beyond market-derived rights to truly reorganize the interactions of EU 
citizens at the micro level, as well as cultural patterns of evaluation at the macro level. It must also 
be accompanied by adequate policy frameworks. Targeted funding provided by the Commission to 
support policies that foster the conditions necessary for disadvantaged groups to take advantage of 
the opportunities of EU citizenship is one example of possible measures.156 
Despite these measures, the impact of the principle of equality beyond market 
participation remains limited. Paradoxically, the liberal human rights turn pushed some of the 
fundamental concerns of substantive equality outside the field of non-discrimination law. 
Considering equality through the lens of Fraser’s ‘bivalent conception of justice’ reveals the 
                                                 
 Such a definition would also have to be adapted to the limits of the EU mandate and understood in the context 
of the relationship between the EU and national legal orders. 
 
152 Some would argue that these could be understood as services available on the free market, but the fact 
that they are heavily regulated in most member states (both in terms of content and minimum 
obligations/protection) means that they are not subsumable within what I have so far called the market (ie 
labour and consumption). Besides, many member states offer a right to health care, and a right to (even an 
obligation to) education. Mobility could also be considered a fundamental right, as it is protected by the 
constitutions of some EU member states. In fact, a number of EU regulations, beyond EU non-discrimination 
law, also specifically protect the rights of eg passengers with disability when travelling. 
153 The prohibition of sex discrimination however excludes the media and education, which are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of the gender directive 2004/113/EC (Art. 3(3)). 
 
154 This is currently explicitly excluded from the prohibition to discriminate based on sex and gender, but the 
potential consequences of such a prohibition in this regard would be far-reaching (eg advertisement). On 
stigmatization, see Solanke (n 141). 
155 See Article 1(a)(b)(c)(d) in Council Framework Decision (CFD) 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on 
combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law OJ L 328/55. In 
particular, it also includes religion along with race, race, colour, and descent or national or ethnic origin as 
relevant grounds. 
156 See, for instance, policy funding policies for the integration of Roma communities, eg the EU Framework 
for National Roma Integration Strategies 2015. 
 
complementarity of two elements: redistribution and recognition.157 From a substantive equality 
perspective, the EU non-discrimination framework falls short of both. The transformative reach of 
the EU non-discrimination principle is limited by the absence of redistributive policies at EU level. 
In lieu of a supranational welfare system, EU non-discrimination law only provides individually 
enforceable corrective mechanisms conditional upon economic participation. These mechanisms are 
criticized for being a palliative to costlier ‘hard’ measures, such as ‘hard-core’ social policies granted 
to disadvantaged groups positively and upstream.158 Somek, for example, claims that non-
discrimination law is normatively deficient  and  ‘disguise[s] the Union’s lack of ability to address 
social concerns’.159 He suggests that EU equality legislation is a mere ersatz compensating for the 
unwillingness to create a European super-welfare state.160 Other scholars have also called for the 
introduction of a ‘welfarist objective in non-discrimination law’.161 
Some authors radically denounce the emptiness of human rights when combined with 
a neoliberal agenda.162 For instance, opponents to the constitutionalization of social rights point out 
that attaching fundamental status to rights that cannot be guaranteed by liberal policy making is mere 
illusion.163 For the EU, the ensuing critique is that constitutionalizing non-discrimination rights can 
only give rise to formal and negative equality in the absence of a comprehensive social policy. This 
circumscribes the EU equality infrastructure to a merely mitigative system unable to defeat 
historically and structurally embedded inequalities. In light of Young’s account, the five faces of 
oppression—exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural domination, and violence—
cannot be overcome exclusively through individual equal treatment,164 but instead required collective 
and positive measures to ‘redress past subordination and discrimination’.165 In this sense, scholars 
have argued for social inclusion measures such as socio-economic solidarity and social protection, 
group-based positive action, and a broader duty to accommodate.166 The EU non-discrimination 
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162 See Audrey R. Chapman, Human Rights, Global Health, and Neoliberal Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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model can thus be criticized for not holding the promise of substantive equality. Human rights 
pessimists argue that indeed the human rights frame is inadequate and that ‘superior projects of 
emancipation’ are needed.167 
All in all, the EU non-discrimination model participates in what Fraser calls the 
‘widespread decoupling of the cultural politics of difference from the social politics of equality’.168 
Symptomatically, the language of substantive equality is almost exclusively found in policies and 
soft law to the detriment of hard law such as the directives and the Treaty.169 As demonstrated by the 
recent adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the pursuit of a social dimension in the EU 
was mostly pushed outside the legal field and instead takes the form of non-binding political 
instruments. It has also proved difficult to reinforce the legal anchor of the social dimensions of the 
principle of non-discrimination in the EU.170 Hence, the transformative reach of the principle of non-
discrimination beyond the market and within the four spheres of substantive equality is limited. The 
decoupling of redistributive and recognition-based remedies to inequality has enabled the 
reconfiguration of the principle of non-discrimination as a site of normative ‘reconciliation’.171 It 
conditioned the current coupling between distributive opportunities and a fundamental rights 
approach to social diversity, has reshaped the principle of non-discrimination.  
The EU non-discrimination legal corpus can thus be seen as a pragmatic compromise 
that guarantees a form of citizenship as socio-economic participation, in line with a transnational 
European proto-society that heavily revolves around market structures and interactions. The form of 
equality it secures is heavily constrained by the boundaries of the EU mandate. Non-discrimination 
serves as a bridging principle between different dimensions of European integration. It is a safeguard 
at supranational level, calling for complementary redistributive measures at national level, the 
determinacy of which is left in the hands of national governments.172 Its transformative reach is, 
however, discontinuous and inconsistent across the spectrum of grounds and fields regulated, 
offering an uneven protection against discrimination.173 The fluctuating content of the principle of 
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167 See Dembour (n 83), 138. 
168 Fraser (1998) (119), 1. 
169 Or the ‘European Disability Strategy 2010–2020’, EU documents on substantive equality such as 
European Commission, Tackling Multiple Discrimination: Practices, Policies and Laws (2007) or European 
Commission, Green paper: Equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged European Union (28 May 2004). 
In EU law, however, the only directive that mentions substantive equality is Directive 2006/54/EC (recast) in 
its recital (24), describing ‘maternity protection measures as a means to achieve substantive equality’. The 
other non-discrimination directives are silent on substantive equality. The directives only mention ‘full 
equality in practice’ to clarify that EU law does not prevent Member States from adopting positive action 
measures. 
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non-discrimination has translated into lasting hierarchies, which create inequalities within 
equality.174 This differentiated protection is the counterpart of the principle’s malleability and 
capacity of reconciling seemingly opposed normative goals.  
IV. Double hierarchies in EU non-discrimination law: a differentiated 
equality protection 
The previous sections highlighted how dichotomous narratives structure current perceptions of the 
normative scope of EU non-discrimination law. Instead of disrupting the ‘old’ economic non-
discrimination principle, however, the constitutional, legislative, and jurisprudential reforms of the 
EU non-discrimination system have rather reinforced its hybridity. In practice, the reconciling power 
of the principle of equality translated into a loss of uniformity and consistency. Symptomatic of this 
hybridity is the twofold hierarchical nature of the principle of equality, de jure and de facto. With the 
introduction of a non-discrimination framework of protection based on multiple grounds in 2000, one 
would have expected the protection to extend uniformly across all legislated grounds. Instead, the 
reforms have durably installed a hierarchy, which limits the transformative reach of the general 
principle of non-discrimination in the EU. 
A. A de jure hierarchy 
The hybridity of the EU non-discrimination system materializes first in the hierarchical nature of its 
legislative setting.175 A de jure hierarchy has been established by the new directives 2000/43/EC, 
2000/78/EC, and 2004/113/EC at three levels: the scope, the exceptions, and the effectiveness of 
secondary legislation. This triple legislative hierarchy arises from the normative complexity created 
by the multi-ground non-discrimination framework progressively constructed in EU law. In fact, an 
important diversity hides behind the apparently integrated regime and the seemingly uniform general 
principle of non-discrimination proclaimed by the CJEU. A tension therefore exists between the 
efforts to reconcile and integrate the diversity of normative, conceptual, and historical origins of the 
different grounds protected in a unique framework, on the one hand, and, on the other, the irreducible 
hybridity and complexity of the different components of that system.176  
(i) A fragmented scope of protection 
Because the non-discrimination law framework has been constructed in layers, the scope of 
protection of each ground is not uniform and is the product of political contingencies rather than an 
emanation of a substantive theory of discrimination.177 These inconsistencies in the protection in 
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effect arbitrarily privilege certain identity traits over others.178 Sex discrimination has historically 
been prohibited in the field of employment, where EU non-discrimination law has its roots. Equal 
pay and equal treatment at work were furthered and completed by directives in the fields of statutory 
social security, occupational social security schemes, self-employment, pregnant workers, and 
parental leave from the 1970s to the 1990s.179 Many of these provisions have been clarified, 
modernized, and harmonized by Recast Directive 2006/54/EC.180 In the meantime, a major extension 
of gender equality protection took place in 2000 with the enactment of Directive 2004/113/EC 
prohibiting discrimination in the access to, and supply of, goods and services.181 In addition, the 
principle of gender mainstreaming requires policy makers to consider the impact of policies on 
gender equality, independently of the area of law concerned. 
As for racial and ethnic discrimination, they are prohibited in several areas: in the 
field of employment, including self-employment, occupation and vocational training; in the area of 
education; social protection (social security and health care) and social advantages; and in the access 
to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing. These prohibitions are 
guaranteed by Directive 2000/43/EC, which at present offers the broadest material scope of 
protection among all grounds.182 
Both race-based and sex-based equality are very broadly protected, notably in two 
major areas of life: employment and consumption. However, comparing the scope of the protection 
they provide reveals a hierarchy. While the Race Equality Directive applies to the field of education, 
the Gender Equality Directive 2004/113/EC explicitly excludes it, as well as other important areas 
such as the media and advertising.183 The Race Equality Directive being silent on the matter, it could 
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be interpreted as including the latter within the concept of ‘services available to the public’.184 
Further, while the whole spectrum of protection against racial discrimination is addressed to all 
citizens, the guarantees offered by the gender equality directives are more differentiated and 
specifically linked to consumption and work.185 
All other grounds are protected under the guarantees laid out in Directive 
2000/78/EC. The Employment Equality Framework Directive protects religion or belief, disability, 
age, and sexual orientation in the area of employment, self-employment, and occupation, covering 
access and promotions, vocational guidance, and (re-)training including practical work experience, 
working conditions (including pay and dismissals), and memberships of professional organizations. 
The protection explicitly excludes state-based social benefits such as social protection and social 
security.186 The scope of the directive is therefore more restrictively defined. The fields of 
consumption of goods and services, social protection as well as education, are left out. This 
limitation makes the level of protection of these four grounds the narrowest across the entire EU non-
discrimination apparatus. 
 
(with the explicit exception of the media and advertising) 
Figure 1. EU non-discrimination secondary law: a hierarchy of scopes of protection 
Note: Nationality has been excluded from the classification because it is only protected by Article 18 
TFEU, and by secondary law only in the area of free movement of persons by Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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Treaty as a work-based protection (Article 119 of the Rome Treaty (now article 157 TFEU) on equal pay), 
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It is explicitly excluded by non-discrimination directives: Article 3(2) of Directive 2000/78/EC and 
Directive 2000/43/EC. 
Hence, only race, and to a certain extent gender equality, are protected beyond the 
strict realm of the labour and consumption markets through social protection and/or educational 
guarantees.187 Within these markets, race and gender equality is also protected to a larger extent than 
the other grounds. These differences translate into a broader horizontal protection of the grounds of 
race and gender, which touches upon a larger set of daily interactions between EU citizens. 
Additional evidence of this hierarchical ordering is the creation of equality bodies, which is only 
mandatory under EU law in the fields of gender and race equality.188 The de jure hierarchy thereby 
extends to the enforcement of non-discrimination law and has materialized into a hierarchy of 
equality rights in practice.189 
The de jure hierarchy also manifests itself in the gap between the protection of 
grounds listed in EU secondary law and the status granted to those set out in primary law. Because 
the Charter’s protection is aligned with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the definition of equality it proposes is broader than in the directives. 
Article 21 of the Charter features an open-ended list of protected grounds, explicitly mentioning 
seven grounds that are not included in the directives, namely language, social origin, genetic 
features, birth, property, political and other opinion, and national minorities.190 The non-
discrimination directives remain silent in this regard, offering no binding protection. This limitation 
also translates into the jurisprudence of the CJEU, which has not yet tackled this discrepancy.191 
Even though a general principle of non-discrimination has been progressively carved out by the 
Court in close association with the Charter’s Article 21, its scope remains limited to grounds of 
discrimination explicitly prohibited by EU secondary law.192 The selectivity of the protection offered 
by EU non-discrimination law in comparison with the Charter collides with the universal and 
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categorical nature of equality understood as a human right. Hence, this de jure hierarchy reflects the 
pragmatic compromise entrenched in the principle of equality which, in the absence of a levelling 
reform, retains a limited transformative power. 
(ii) Legislative exceptions 
The exceptions provided for each ground in the directives further illustrate the hybridity of equality. 
They accommodate the diversity of normative foundations underlying the protection of each ground 
within a seemingly uniform and integrated principle and regime. Apart from the general exception of 
a genuine occupational requirement, which in rare instances authorizes differential treatment, 
discrimination based on certain grounds is more easily justifiable than on others.193 The Framework 
Equality Directive, for instance, foresees in its Article 3(4) that the non-discrimination provisions on 
grounds of disability and age may not apply to the armed forces while Article 4(2) provides 
exceptions for religious institutions, which can impose certain conditions on their employees. 
Besides, public order concerns can justify discrimination based on all grounds except gender and 
race.194 
When it comes to age, Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC provides for specific 
derogations, thus lowering the level of protection against age discrimination in comparison to other 
grounds.195 These exceptions take the form of objective and reasonable ‘justifications’ of differential 
treatment, which must serve a legitimate aim. The provision is broad, and the high number of 
possible justifications has yielded numerous referrals to the CJEU. Usually justifications only apply 
to indirect, and not direct, discrimination but in the case of differential treatment based on age both 
types can be justified as Article 6 does not make the distinction. The CJEU is therefore left with 
important discretion in its interpretation of the justifications. Finally, the protection of national origin 
is restricted by Directive 2000/43/EC so as to respect Member States’ power to control immigration 
at their borders. Nationality is also excluded from the definition of race and ethnic origin. Some 
commentators have expressed concern that this exception might entail more problematic 
consequences than exceptions based on other grounds, for instance serving as a limitation of the 
protection against racial discrimination for third-country nationals.196  
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The sum of these different derogations contributes to the fragmentation of the 
protection against discrimination. They show that in practice a high number of concessions is needed 
to hold the principle of equality together and secure its reconciling power. 
(iii) A differentiated effectiveness 
The differentiated effectiveness of non-discrimination law, which relates both to the source and to 
the judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions, is a third instance in which the de jure hierarchy 
manifests itself.197 To start with the first, historical enshrinement in the Treaty has placed the various 
protected grounds differently on the scale of protection. Originally, the prohibition of sex 
discrimination stems from the Treaty (Article 119 TEC on equal pay, now Article 157 TFEU). This 
explains why the Court gave horizontal direct effect to the principle of sex equality in the context of 
employment in Defrenne II although directives cannot be directly horizontally effective. The 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality also benefited from a limited but similar 
horizontal direct effect under certain circumstances.198 The Treaty anchor explained the existence of 
a general principle of non-discrimination on both grounds, which in turn explained the horizontal 
direct effects.199 
Section II of this paper clarified how the Court recently revived the debate by deriving 
a form of horizontal direct effect from the general principle of non-discrimination underpinning 
Directive 2000/78/EC, this time on grounds of age, with a view to setting aside national legislation. 
The first occurrence was in Mangold, where the CJEU gave validity to the general principle even 
though the transposition time of the directive had not yet passed. The CJEU later confirmed the 
horizontal direct effectiveness of this principle in Kücükdeveci, and more recently in Dansk 
Industri.200 The novelty is twofold. The general principle at stake first generates horizontal direct 
effects without being a written source of EU law, thus contrasting with the Treaty origin of the same 
principle for sex and nationality.201 Second, it stands out because of its level of abstraction, which 
diverges from the level of preciseness and clarity habitually required to generate direct effect.202 This 
recent jurisprudential innovation extends the effectiveness of EU law on further grounds.203 
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In view of its recent character, questions arise regarding the material scope of this 
general principle, its extension to other grounds, and its effectiveness.204 We can in fact wonder 
whether the Mangold approach will be fully extended to grounds other than age. Following Steve 
Peers, it would be ‘absurd to privilege one particular aspect of the right to non-discrimination over 
other aspects of that right’.205 Yet in Römer, which concerned a vertical relationship, the CJEU gave 
a sign in this direction. It alluded to the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation without it producing direct effects.206 Following Römer, the CJEU also 
recognized a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race arising from Article 21 of 
the Charter in CHEZ.207 The principle could thus potentially extend to all grounds covered by EU 
secondary law, expanding the ‘new and distinctive substantive discrimination architecture’ identified 
by Claire Kilpatrick in relation to age.208 If that proved true, would the horizontal direct effects 
doctrine be applicable to all grounds protected under the EU non-discrimination regime?209 
Uncertainties remain as to the effects of the general principle of non-discrimination in light of the 
ground-specific hierarchies of protection.210 This effect would not in any event cover the broad and 
non-exhaustive list of grounds foreseen by Article 21. The inconsistency of the EU equality corpus 
of norms might thus affect the very existence and reach of the non-discrimination principle, casting 
doubt on its general nature. 
In light of these innovations, the question of the relationship between the EU human 
rights order as expressed in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the EU non-
discrimination regime stands out more than ever before. Equality as a human rights principle seems 
to be developing an existence beyond the EU secondary law non-discrimination apparatus, notably 
through its effectiveness. Nevertheless, until today the hybridity of non-discrimination law has 
mainly contributed to the creation of another line of hierarchy within equality in the EU. This de jure 
hierarchy has given rise to an uneven ground-based protection that can be read as a pragmatic 
response to the composite normative, conceptual, and historical foundations of the EU non-
discrimination regime. 
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B. De facto hierarchy and the contested transformative scope of the principle 
of equality 
Beyond the strict legal framework, praxes around the principle of equality also reveal a de facto 
hierarchy which testifies to the plurality of existing normative demands in relation to non-
discrimination law in the EU. This second line of hierarchy shows what Westen called ‘the fallacy of 
the independent norm’, that is, the protean substance of equality as determined by the agenda of 
those who invoke it.211  
(i) The backlash against a more transformative equality principle 
If the non-discrimination principle has undoubtedly become embedded in EU citizenship through its 
fundamental status, its transformative role remains contested within a broader disagreement over the 
role of the EU itself. A levelling reform proposed in 2008 by the Commission should have alleviated 
the limitations linked to the existing de jure hierarchy.212 However, the transformative motion 
slowed down after 2008 due to the stalemate in the negotiations over the so-called ‘Horizontal 
Proposal’. By putting an end to the fragmentation of the EU equality corpus, the proposed directive 
aimed to enhance the transformative bite of non-discrimination legislation and to enhance its 
uniformity ‘in all areas of life’.213 It sought to further regulate the private relationships of EU citizens 
through extending the horizontal reach of non-discrimination rights on grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age, and sexual orientation beyond employment and vocational training, where these 
grounds are already protected, towards other areas in which an important proportion of 
discriminatory behaviours occurs. These areas relate to the access to, and supply of, goods and 
services available to the public including housing, in both the public and the private sectors; but also 
the field of social protection, including social security and health care; social advantages; and 
education. In so doing, this ambitious reform intended to align the rules regarding these grounds with 
those pertaining to the grounds of race and gender, and hence to fill the existing gaps.214 
Despite an important coalition of transnational NGOs215 and the European Parliament 
supporting the legislative proposal, it faced strong opposition from certain EU Member States in the 
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Council of Ministers, notably Germany and Poland.216 Although they were initially in favour of 
extending the transformative scope of the non-discrimination principle, Member States have so far 
failed to reach an agreement, invoking inter alia a too heavy regulatory burden and the risk of 
contravening the principle of subsidiarity.217 EU Member States have also questioned the need for 
such a directive and opposed the inclusion of access to social protection within the scope of the 
proposal, privileging non-binding political solutions over law to re-assert the place of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the EU.218 In parallel, market actors insisted on the ensuing costs to business 
and the risks of increased legal uncertainty.219 Despite Juncker’s pledge in 2014 that ‘[t]he Anti-
Discrimination Directive w[ould] remain on the table’ and his promise to ‘persuade the Council to 
adopt at least the core proposals as soon as possible’, fragmentation remains the rule.220 
In addition, the authority of the European judiciary has been confronted by concerns 
over national sovereignty, private autonomy, and legal certainty in a tensed political context. Harsh 
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criticisms have followed the Court’s ventures in its interpretation of the new directives and the 
Charter, especially after the jurisprudential series from Mangold221 to Kücükdeveci222 and later 
Dansk Industri.223 The backlash was twofold. On the one hand, the autonomy of private parties and 
their freedom to conduct business were seen as endangered. Critics denounced the Court’s activism 
and efforts to shoehorn the principle of non-discrimination into a rigid fundamental rights principle 
with ‘strong moral status’.224 On the other hand, many—and not least the Member States—were 
concerned about the new repartition of competences ensuing from the constitutionalization of the 
general principle of non-discrimination. Some scholars also accused the Court of overstepping its 
competences and appealed to ‘Stop the ECJ!’, claiming that Mangold was ‘only one of many 
judgments significantly interfering with competences of the member states’.225  
In the aftermath of the controversial Test-Achats judgment,226 the CJEU was similarly 
criticized for striking down a provision of EU law that had been agreed on by the Member States and 
thereby overstepping its competences and acting as a de facto legislator.227 In the same perspective, 
the Danish constitutional court set aside the interpretation of the CJEU in its recent resounding 
judgment in the Dansk Industri case.228 This open conflict between the supranational judge and a 
national court has sparked much criticism towards the CJEU’s ‘intrusive’, ‘activist’, insensitive, and 
‘categorical’ jurisprudence.229 Its extensive interpretation of the non-discrimination principle was 
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deemed as going beyond the boundaries of Article 19 TFEU (ex-Article 13 TEC) and breaching the 
subsidiary character of non-discrimination clauses, thus threatening judicial cooperation for the sake 
of promoting its own integration-prone agenda. 
If the Court currently appears as a less active engine of EU integration in the field of 
equality, it might be because the backlash against the Court’s daring jurisprudential innovations 
created a willingness on the CJEU’s side to avoid further controversy, at least in some discrimination 
fields. This surely combines with difficulties to consistently inscribe equality within a coherent and 
uniform normative frame. The polarizing demands stemming from the different understandings of 
the principle of equality in the EU and the resulting hybridity are symptomatic of a broader 
disagreement on the role of the Union itself. On the one hand, the ambition to strengthen the EU’s 
mission as a protector of human rights is endorsed by EU institutions willing to transform EU 
citizenship through fundamental human rights, notably through a broad equality mandate.230 On the 
other, national governments advocating for a functional role for the Union within the strict 
boundaries of subsidiarity support a more limited vision of the EU equality mandate.  
(ii) A de facto hierarchy in judicial scrutiny 
In addition to upholding many of the legal justifications made possible by the various directives, the 
CJEU has also applied different levels of scrutiny to the various protected grounds, leading to 
differentiated equality guarantees. One way to explain these variations is to look at the rationales 
underlying the protection of the different grounds. Because each ground needs specific remedies, 
there cannot be a one-size-fits-all interpretation of the meaning of equality across the entire spectrum 
of grounds.231 Thus, judicial interpretation pragmatically allows the introduction of a minimal de 
facto scale of scrutiny in order to accommodate the normative plurality of equality within the 
Union’s integrated multi-ground non-discrimination regime. 
First, this de facto hierarchy emanates from the implementation by the CJEU of the 
exceptions and justifications contained in the directives. Because of its specific nature, age might be 
the most telling example. Age being experienced by all individuals throughout their life, it bears a 
qualitatively different load than other discrimination grounds. For instance, it is widely accepted that 
protection from discrimination on the grounds of age should not be absolute (eg minimum age 
requirements to apply for a job), contrary to an almost absolute protection against racial 
discrimination within the scope of EU law.232 In fact, the experience of age discrimination is an 
evolving one, and stereotypes linked to age vary widely according to time and space. Age 
discrimination can take several forms based on whether it concerns young or old age. As a result, age 
is a ground of discrimination experienced by the majority, instead of a so-called ‘minority’ identity 
marker.233 At the same time, the long history and widely accepted nature of protection measures 
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against age discrimination, which are traditionally part of national welfare models, could explain the 
CJEU’s temerity in contradicting certain age-based domestic and private policies, but also at the 
same time the wider margin of appreciation left to EU Member States in applying legislative 
exceptions.234 Following Kilpatrick, the Court in fact applies a dual standard of scrutiny in age 
discrimination cases depending on the policy issues concerned.235 It follows that the Court adopted a 
mixed approach to age discrimination, considering differential treatment on grounds of age to 
sometimes be more justifiable because of its mutable nature and its strong economic bearing, and 
sometimes to be an easier basis for intervention in national policies compared to grounds that have 
been more politically disputed, such as religion, in the context of laicity or sexual orientation in the 
context of survivor’s benefits and partnerships.236 
While some courts, such as the United States Supreme Court, rely on an explicit scale 
of judicial review, this is not the case at the CJEU. Still, to some extent the level of scrutiny applied 
implicitly depends on the predominant conceptual and normative underpinning of the legislative 
protection at stake. Such underpinnings could range, for example, from the genuine protection of 
fundamental rights to furthering integration of labour markets and increasing employment rates. 
‘[B]alancing seemingly contradicting principles of autonomy and non-discrimination’ is a relative 
task because the balancing exercise performed by the Court depends on the area of law and the 
ground concerned.237 In this balancing task, the rationale underlying the protection of each ground 
might tip the balance in favour of one or the other principles at stake, depending on the ground 
protected and its context of invocation, following the overarching goals of the Union. Prechal holds 
in this sense that ‘the different rationales not only influence the interpretation and application of the 
various concepts of equality and non-discrimination, [but] also influence their mutual 
relationship’.238 Because the CJEU tends to read economic interests in light of fundamental rights 
and vice versa to craft its equality jurisprudence, the implicit scrutiny scale applied by the CJEU is 
difficult to read. The irreducible conceptual complexity and normative hybridity of the protection 
against discrimination makes it difficult to infer the strictness of judicial review from the ground and 
field concerned. 
Some features can still be distinguished. For instance, Prechal describes the review 
standard for nationality cases as very strict. One can reasonably explain this high standard through 
the historical nature of the protection and the status of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
as a sine qua non condition for the construction of the Single Market. Gender equality enjoys a 
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strong moral status arising from both the functional protection linked to its economic implications for 
the Single Market, and the more recently acquired fundamental right status linked to Article 19 
TFEU. Both the economic and the human rights rationale are relevant for all other grounds but one 
rationale might prevail over the other, thus inducing variations. Age, for instance, is to be considered 
within a broadly looser level of scrutiny caused by the numerous justifications mentioned earlier.239 
Regarding disability, the level of scrutiny is adapted to the duty of reasonable accommodation, which 
relies on the fundamental right to equality as dignity and inclusion, but might also rely on the 
economic rationale of including disabled workers in the EU labour force to reduce unemployment 
rates. This, however, is not the case for religion, which does not benefit from such a duty of 
reasonable accommodation under EU law, despite its protection within a broader human rights frame 
in the EU, at the UN, and at the Council of Europe.240 In fact, in the absence of a consensus on the 
place of religion in society within the EU, and in a context of both rising Islamophobia and the 
politicization of the religious question in European societies (especially as regards Islam), it is 
unlikely that the CJEU will express strong views on religious accommodation. The recent decision in 
Achbita in fact indicates restraint in a context of high political sensitivity linked to questions of 
sovereignty and cultural identity.241 Finally, race equality enjoys a high level of scrutiny linked to its 
historical international status of a fundamental human right,242 a rationale which also underpins non-
discrimination based on sexual orientation, although this area has also been caught between concerns 
about national sovereignty and matters of family law.243 
Variations in the link between non-discrimination protection and the Charter is a third 
instance where different levels of judicial scrutiny appear. In some cases like Tyrolean Airways244 
and Vital Pérez,245 the CJEU declined to examine the case in light of the Charter even though the 
referring courts specifically asked for an interpretation of the non-discrimination provision contained 
in its Article 21. In another instance, Römer, the Court found the existence of a general principle of 
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equal treatment but did not mention the Charter as one of its sources. Instead, it highlighted its 
origins in ‘various international instruments and … the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States’.246 The link between the general principle of non-discrimination and the set of 
fundamental rights promoted by the EU is therefore unsystematic, and even blurry at times, casting 
doubts on the Court’s motivations. On the one hand, the CJEU engages with a rights-driven 
discourse, where equality is upheld as a fundamental right and a constitutional principle with high 
moral status. On the other hand, in practice this narrative loses explanatory power when non-
discrimination rights are overridden by competing normative demands such as market-related 
interests, concerns over private autonomy, subsidiarity, sovereignty, deference to the policy-making 
branch, and probably also the willingness to avoid controversies.247 The normative hybridity of 
equality makes the different rationales difficult to disentangle in the jurisprudence of the Court, 
especially when presented as dimensions that are inherent in the principle of equality. 
Finally, the context and circumstances of given cases also influence the court’s 
scrutiny. Conflicting social interests meet a different equilibrium across the spectrum of protected 
grounds, which induces a preference given to one or the other goals pursued by the EU though its 
equality agenda. Prechal claims, for instance, that in the case of gender a looser test is applied in 
social security or taxation compared to employment or pay discrimination.248 Another illustration is 
provided by Kilpatrick who explains how the Court applies a looser test to issues of retirement and 
exit programmes in age discrimination cases.249 These contextual variations reflect the influence of 
the Union’s different overarching goals on non-discrimination judicial review. They are neither 
constant nor straightforwardly readable. All in all, the CJEU’s approach is difficult to classify neatly, 
as confirmed by Prechal, once again, who states that ‘while there is a rule of thumb—strict scrutiny 
wherever one of the prohibited grounds is at stake—the [Court] is rather pragmatic in its approach 
and not very principled, sometimes contrary to its own declaration of equality and non-
discrimination being fundamental principles or rights’.250 The transformative reach of non-
discrimination law is thus further limited by the inconsistency of the balancing operated between 
conflicting concerns, making the EU non-discrimination regime resemble a ‘patchwork’.251 The fact 
that the normative hybridity subsumed in the Union’s integrated multi-ground approach and the 
conceptual underpinnings of the principle of non-discrimination are not explicit makes equality 
jurisprudence difficult to read and foresee. 
(iii) A de facto hierarchy created by differentiated volumes of preliminary referrals 
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Lastly, the levels of litigation and referrals to the CJEU, which differ based on grounds, timing, and 
member states of origin, de facto influence the development and the level of protection of the 
grounds concerned.252 Having a look at the references for preliminary ruling brought to the Court 
since the 2000s gives a good impression of the existence of hierarchies of referrals between the 
grounds protected. The quantity of references indeed largely varies for each of the different protected 
grounds. While a high number generally indicate a high level of litigation at the level of EU Member 
States (all things considered) and is thus a good indicator of the importance of the issue, a lower 
level indicates a lower willingness, preparedness, sensitivity, or need (eg is the application of the law 
clear enough?) either on the part of national courts to bring the issue in front of the CJEU, or on the 
part of public interest lawyers or private parties to litigate cases on the issues concerned. At the same 
time, the hierarchy in litigation also contributes to different levels of acquaintance with, and 
reflection about, the protection of different grounds at the CJEU, thus impacting the content of the 
case law. 
It is striking that the first references for religious discrimination have only been made 
in 2015 and amounted to two cases only up to 2017253, while Directive 2000/78/EC protecting 
individuals from religious discrimination was passed in 2000 and transposed at the latest in 2003.254 
In the same vein, the first references for racial discrimination deemed admissible by the Court have 
been made only in 2007 and then in 2011,255 while the transposition delay of Directive 2000/43/EC 
was 2003. In contrast, age discrimination has been the object of references for preliminary rulings 
from national courts much earlier—since 2004.  
At the same time, the number of references for age discrimination has surpassed all 
other grounds, amounting to fifty-five references brought to the CJEU by national courts over the 
period 2004–15.256 It is interesting to note that a majority of decisions regarding age discrimination 
originate from references for preliminary ruling by German courts (50.9 per cent over the period 
2004-15), and to a lesser extent, Austrian and Danish courts (respectively 14.5 per cent and 10.9 per 
cent). Hypotheses regarding the cause for this could include the ageing structure of their labour 
markets, the activity of trade unions, or labour market reforms in these countries. Preliminary 
referrals on other grounds have been far less numerous. This high volume of age-based referrals in 
fact compares over the same period to twelve references only for disability257 and nine for sexual 
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254 It is not surprising that these references arise from France and Belgium. Preliminary references based on 
religion: Achbita [2017] (n 21) and Bougnaoui [2017] (n 21). 
255 Preliminary references based on race: Feryn [2008] (n 64) referred in 2007 and then CHEZ [2015] (n 21) 
in 2014 recognized discrimination. Before this, C-328/04 Vajnai [2005] EU:C:2005:596 referred in 2004, C-
310/10 Ministerul Justiţiei și Libertăţilor Cetăţenești v Ştefan Agafiţei and Others [2011] EU:C:2011:467 
referred in 2010 and C-394/11 Valeri Hariev Belov contre CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD e.a. [2013] 
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referred in 2009 and Jyske Finans [2017], (n 196). 
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five references. 
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orientation258 which rank respectively second and third in the de facto hierarchy of references. Only 
nine references have been made on grounds of race over the same period, four of which have been 
deemed inadmissible. Besides, when referred, the questions asked of the CJEU as to disability, 
sexual orientation, and race were more basic than for age.259 At the bottom of the hierarchy comes 
religion, with only two decisions up to 2017.260 It seems that the new developments brought by 
Directive 2004/113/EC to the historical protection of gender equality have also provoked little 
effusion at the national level, with only two decisions up to 2017 since its transposition deadline ten 
years before.261 
Highlighting the presence of a multi-faceted hierarchy within EU non-discrimination 
law sheds light on the incompleteness of the EU equality project. The fact that this double hierarchy 
results not only from individual reforms contingent upon political pragmatism, but also from the 
normative reconciliation operated by the principle of equality, poses problems in terms of the 
consistency of value-based decision-making and the prioritization of protection.262 This observation 
thus constitutes an incentive for further reflection about ways to bring consistency within the EU 
equality model, taking into account the conceptual complexities of each ground and the normative 
hybridity inherent in a general principle of non-discrimination, as well as the Union’s overarching 
aims and the substance of EU citizenship. Far from calling for a kind of ‘false uniformity in EU non-
discrimination legislation, the presence of hierarchies demonstrates that the condition for a hybrid 
but coherent and efficient EU equality model is an explicit and reasoned clarification of the 
rationales of protection for each ground and of the scope and normative underpinnings of the general 
principle of non-discrimination.263 
V. Conclusion 
While it is attractive to a posteriori reconstruct the expansion of the EU non-discrimination regime 
as a tipping point in the recent history of the European Union, a critical examination reveals that the 
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their relatively less developed jurisprudential elaboration. They concerned, for instance, the definitions of the 
grounds, the exclusion from benefits of same-sex partners, etc. In the case of race, it could also be explained 
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protection reflects protection already granted by national law. 
260 Achbita [2017] (n 21) and Bougnaoui [2017] (n 21). CJEU case law on religion has however been 
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261 These are the landmark case Test-Achats [2011] (n 54), which has however given rise to a small 
revolution; and indirectly C-318/13 X (para. 48-9, 51) according to the CURIA search database. No 
comprehensive search was run on the basis of the existing six directives and relevant Treaty provisions for 
gender non-discrimination, but the amount of preliminary references is very high, as the legislation has been 
available for a much longer period of time. 
262 See Howard (2006) (n 143). Howard argues that this hierarchy is based on political pragmatism instead of 
a systemic political reflection and a socially conscious choice. 
263 McCrudden (166), 17. McCrudden further insists that the ‘pressure for consistency in legal interpretation 
is potentially problematic because, unless considerable care is taken, necessary differences in the way the 
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grand narrative of transformation of EU citizenship through fundamental rights needs to be nuanced. 
On the one hand, the reforms of the 2000s indisputably made important changes to the equality 
regime of the Union. A triple motion deepened and broadened the scope of non-discrimination law 
and anchored it to the realm of human rights law. At the micro-level, the hold of the principle of 
equality over EU citizens increased through a greater influence on large subsets of interpersonal 
relationships and social interactions. Ultimately, the principle of non-discrimination should change 
behaviours, social patterns of choice, and cognitive schemes thus re-modelling social and economic 
participation at EU level.264 At the macro-level, the understanding of equality evolved too. The 
language of fundamental rights imposed a new framing that gained acceptance in collective 
imaginaries over the years. In this regard, we should not underestimate the role of discourse in 
shaping perceptions and reality: thanks to this new legitimizing narrative, the EU could promote 
itself as a key protector of fundamental rights and find a new impetus for its mandate in a time of 
crisis. To be sure, the way we understand equality in the framework of EU law was indelibly 
affected. Proof of this is the broader debate it sparked over the role of the Union. 
On the other hand, this discursive strategy rested on a rhetoric of normative disruption which, as this 
article has showed, is misleading. It constructed a binary opposition between the historical rationale 
of market integration that underpins the origins of EU non-discrimination law and the human rights 
‘revolution’ brought by the reforms of the 2000s. A closer look at the mechanics of the non-
discrimination regime and the operationalization of the principle of equality shows that this is a false 
dichotomy. In reality, equality is a hybrid construct that, as Westen predicted, embodies and 
accommodates different normative demands.265 The case of the Union is no exception. This article 
has shown how equality is a vehicle for distinct normative projects. A prerequisite for overcoming 
the ‘tautology’ inherent in the formulation of a ‘right to equality’ is in fact understanding the very 
substance of this right, and how it reconciles and accommodates these different demands.266 As the 
present multi-level analysis has shown by examining how equality is constructed, told, constituted 
and operated in the EU, the reforms of the 2000s reconfigured equality as a space for 
complementarity between economic competition, market integration and identity-based non-
discrimination rights. Of course, this is not a linear story and other explanatory factors such as 
political pragmatism, historical and economic contingencies and path-dependency need to be 
considered when recounting the evolution of the normative foundations of EU equality law. 
In practice, the hybrid nature of equality bears important consequences. It translates into 
considerable limits to the scope and reach of enforceable equality rights, as the hierarchies exposed 
in this article testify. The existing dissonance between a bold political discourse on the centrality of 
equality in the Union and the current uncertainties on the actual legal content of the principle of non-
discrimination need to be addressed. Despite these limits and the fact that the non-discrimination 
battle lost its priority on the Member States’ political agenda, non-discrimination law could be 
read—in an optimistic light—as one of the building blocks and safeguards of a form of de minimis 
EU citizenship. In a period of multi-faceted crisis, the very blurriness of the boundaries and reach of 
the principle of equality in the EU legal order could prove an opportunity to clarify its moral 
substance and status. Specifically, the conceptual and normative foundations of equality would need 
to be clarified and made explicit in relation to each ground of protection for non-discrimination 
rights to realize their full protective potential and transformative impact. This reflection would give 
the different actors involved in the construction of the EU non-discrimination regime a sounder 
methodological and analytical basis to enforce, claim and further develop equality protection. 
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